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 ABSTRACT  
 
 In this paper, I outlined a framework for understanding how and 
why future-related biases took root in the human mind, and made some 
suggestions about possible ways we might be able to mitigate their effect 
in the context of the strategic foresight practice. My primary research 
methods consisted of a broad literature review covering pertinent areas of 
cognitive science, evolutionary psychology, management science, and 
future studies, as well as expert interviews with experts representing these 
fields. I concluded the paper with suggestions about how to integrate the 
findings from fields that scientifically investigate human foresight and 
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 1.  THE CHALLENGE OF FORESIGHT 	  
Strategic foresight has a clear normative component. The key 
justification for conducting a strategic foresight exercise is that certain 
ways of imagining and thinking about the future are better than others for 
the purpose of guiding decision-making, and that we can develop better 
future thinking through application of the strategic foresight 
methodology. The first clause above is reasonably uncontroversial. As we 
will see, large swaths of evolutionary history were driven by difference in 
survival rates of creatures adept at anticipating and acting on the future 
and those less able; it’s clear that good futuring makes a real difference in 
decision making and, therefore, survivability. But how strong is the 
second claim: that strategic foresight itself leads to better future thinking? 
In order to assess this claim, we need to first understand a little bit more 
about the way strategic foresight works. 
Foresight strategist Richard Slaughter defines his craft as “the 
ability to create and maintain a high-quality, coherent and functional 
forward view, and to use the insights arising in useful organizational 
ways” (Slaughter 2003, p, 104). As an overview, Slaughter’s rendering is 
fairly comprehensive, but it necessarily only hints at the two major 
complexities inherit in the strategic foresight methodology.  
First, the “forward view” that strategic foresight enables us to 
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create and maintain is, in most cases, actually several forward views, or 
scenarios, exploring a space of possibilities. Practitioners of strategic 
foresight often stress the need to pluralize the future (Van Alstyne 2010, 
70). At first blush, this sentiment can either confuse or exasperate, 
depending on the hearer’s temperament and tolerance for ambiguity. 
What could it possibly mean? 
The call to pluralize the future becomes especially confusing when, 
as often happens, people elide over the difference between and foresight 
strategists and a certain brand of futurists that believe its possible to make 
meaningful point predictions about the future.1 Methodologically, and 
ideologically, there are many important differences between these two 
stances, a thorough discussion of which is beyond the purview of this 
project.  
A common touch point, however, for both foresight strategists and 
these predictive futurists is their mutual admiration for science fiction 
narratives, and their eagerness to leverage them in their respective 
practices. The difference in the way they go about this reveals something 
of what foresight strategists typically mean by “pluralizing the future.”  
Predictive futurists, naturally, stress the predictive aspect of science 
fiction in order to make a case for the knowability of the future through 
keen insight, sound research, and proper inference. Foresight strategists, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 I’m taking care here not to paint all brands of futurism with the same brush; as 
futurist Wendy Schultz pointed out to me, there are many practitioners self 
identifying as futurists who are “interested in images of our futures broadly 
extent [sic] in society, as well as cultural biases, and depth analysis/critique of 
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on the other hand, celebrate the ability for science fiction narratives to 
emotionally and mentally draw us into unfamiliar worlds and imagine 
others or ourselves therein as agents (Schroeder, 2012). This is illustrative 
of the contrasting professional aims of predictive futurists and foresight 
strategists: predictive futurists try to corral the future itself by generating 
arguments which point to some probable future state or range of future 
states, while foresight strategists seek instead to multiply and vivify what 
psychologists call our episodic thinking about the future, and use these 
episodes as frames for assessing strategic decisions.  
The call from foresight strategists to pluralize the future, therefore, 
is not a prelude to a lecture about the importance of considering the 
function of un-collapsed probability waves, or the virtues of the “many 
worlds” hypothesis, or the importance of Lewisian modal realism in the 
context of strategic work.2 It’s not about the future, as a dimension of time, 
at all. Rather, it is meant to encourage in the hearer a mindset conducive to 
the creation and curation of multiple mental images of possible future 
worlds. The cultivation of these mental images, according to Kees Van Der 
Heijden, accomplishes the first objective of foresight, which is to provide 
the “requisite variety in mental models necessary to see and perceive the 
outside world beyond the traditional business models,” or governance 
models, or community building models, etc. 
It also serves the other key objective of foresight, which is to use 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 For better or worse, foresight strategists can only perform foresight exercises in 
the actual world, and not in merely possible worlds. 
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these broadly aligned mental models as backdrops against which to pre-
perform future strategic plays (Van Der Heijden 2005, 132). The quality, 
coherence, and functionality of these mental images therefore has less to 
do with whether one or the other of them come true in the long run and 
much more to do with the way they interact with the cognitive toolkits, 
beliefs, and broader mental models of people who interact with them. 
That foresight generates a multiplicity of views of the future rather 
than a probabilistic prediction is something that foresight strategists do a 
good job of communicating to clients as a baseline expectation. However, 
that the success of the engagement depends fundamentally on the ability 
for participants to examine, probe, and alter their personal mental images 
of the future, though sometimes broadly articulated, is less often 
thoroughly explored.  
Thinking About the Future, the indispensible manual of strategic 
foresight edited by Andy Hines and Peter Bishop, does a better job of 
addressing the relationship between these two goals of the practice. The 
authors identify mental models as “the deeply ingrained assumptions, 
generalizations, or images that influence how one makes sense of and 
responds to the world, and suggest that changing the mental models of 
decision makers is a key outcome of the foresight activity. They go on to 
suggest that mental models are “usually biased toward the past, and are 
often vague or based on faulty assumptions about the future” (Hines and 
Bishop 2006, 30). These faulty assumptions give rise to an official or default 
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future based on an uncritical belief in incremental change “that pretty 
much preserves the current paradigm or way of doing things” (Ibid 2006, 
85). The process of expanding “the range and depth of possibilities for the 
organization to consider” can challenge these default futures, thereby 
helping to reduce “the likelihood and magnitude of surprise” in the future 
(Ibid 2006, 85). 
Here, Hines and Bishop articulate a key assumption of foresight: 
creating and utilizing multiple, robust “forward views” naturally loosens 
the grip that inadequate default futures have on our minds. The 
assumption has strong prima facie appeal. But I think it is mistaken, and 
that the matter is not nearly so straightforward. Under the right conditions 
– perhaps even in most cases – consideration of several forward views can 
have the effect suggested by Hines and Bishop. But, as we will see, it may 
also have no appreciable effect on an individual’s commitment to the 
default future, or may even serve to strengthen their existing commitment 
to it in some cases.  
Why might this be the case? By way of an explanation, let’s return 
once more to the contrast between foresight and predictive futurism. 
Since foresight strategists need not concern themselves with the 
question of the precise likelihood that any of their scenarios might 
accurately predict the future, it might seem like their project is 
comparatively less taxing than the work of futurists. I do not believe this is 
the case, at least in cases where foresight is robustly performed.  
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Accurately predicting the future is, of course, gruelingly hard work. 
Even in a relatively circumscribed domain of inquiry, accurate prediction 
work improves only through highly original thought, painstaking 
research and development, piecemeal engineering efforts, and relentless 
troubleshooting and fine-tuning.  
Take forecasting the weather as an example. Just thirty years ago, 
hurricane prediction systems would routinely miscalculate landfalls by as 
much as 350 miles. Today, the average miss is about 100 miles: a threefold 
improvement in the predictive power of hurricane modeling. The amount 
of effort expended to effect even this change boggles the mind. Wrangling 
nonlinear, dynamic systems like hurricanes means, for instance, 
accounting for fluctuating barometric pressures to the fourth decimal 
place; meteorologists discovered that rounding to the third decimal would 
lead to confusing results, in which the same predictive weather model 
“would somehow forecast clear skies over Colorado in one run and a 
thunderstorm in the next” (Silver 2012a).  
Computing the complex interactions of social, technological, 
environmental, economic, and political factors in order to make real, 
measurable progress in the rates of accurate prediction of world events is 
an exponentially harder task, and one that we’ve barely embarked on. The 
current state of the art, if one could call it that, is quite dismal: Philip 
Tetlock’s long term study of political forecasts found, for instance, that 
when political experts described an event as being absolutely certain, it 
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failed to happen one fourth of the time. What’s more, their performance 
was only marginally better than that of dilettantes in the subject area, and 
marginally worse than algorithms enacting barebones models of change 
(Tetlock 2005, 55). If weighty political experts were the example par 
excellence of our predictive capabilities in the realm of political events, this 
would be as if our most sophisticated hurricane modeling systems barely 
outperformed someone sticking their finger in the air in order to judge the 
direction of the wind.  
Forecasters have it rough. But delivering robust, representative, 
and actionable strategic foresight projects requires grappling with a 
system whose nonlinearities and dynamism make weather systems look 
simple by comparison. The system is not in the external world, but in the 
minds of individuals engaged in the foresight process. Foresight strategists 
don’t necessarily have to concern themselves with the probability of 
external events taking place; when asked, it’s a professional convention to 
demure from assigning probabilities to scenario work. But they ought to 
concern themselves, for instance, with the subjective weight participants 
assign to the possibilities discussed in foresight activities, and specifically 
the automatic and unexamined psychological and cognitive factors that go 
into determining these weightings; when left unaccounted, these factors 
can easily “poison the well” for a foresight exercise, causing it to become 
an exercise in the amplification and confirmation of pre-conceived notions 
about the future.  
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Put simply: Futurists’ greatest occupational hazard is the brute 
probabilistic nature of the world. For foresight strategists, it’s the raft of 
biases and heuristics deeply embedded in human thinking and decision 
making, the effects of which can steer us into endorsing and acting on 
images of the futures that do not serve our goals, feed on our prejudices, 
play to our fears, and satisfy our egos rather than prepare us to clear-
headedly face uncertainty.3  
How big is the problem? The assumptions, generalizations, images, 
and biases about the future that Hines and Bishop refer to are deeply 
ingrained indeed. So deeply ingrained, in fact, that they are the way much 
of our mind naturally works. It is not only the received future within an 
organization that we are working against. If that were the case, the act of 
presenting alternative visions of the future would itself likely be sufficient 
to effect the change of mental models. The cause of the uncertain 
relationship between scenarios and mental models is the susceptibility of 
our minds to biases and heuristics that distort our thinking and lead us to 
misperceive the world in various ways. When not engaged in slow, 
deliberative thinking, our minds instead default to processes such as “the 
automatic firing of over-learned associations, behavioral regulation by 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3 Briefly, a heuristic is an information-processing rule that allows us to take a 
“mental shortcut” to reaching a conclusion. A bias, on the other hand, arises as a 
result of the misapplication of heuristic rules. In other words, heuristic reasoning 
doesn’t necessarily lead us to biased decision making, but it opens the door to the 
effects of bias. As we will see, the use of heuristics when reasoning about the 
future appears to be particularly troublesome, leading to “severe and systemic 
errors” (Kahneman & Tversky 1973, 241). 
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emotions and processes of implicit learning”, and a raft of other 
unconscious processes that impact our thinking without our knowing 
(Stanovich et al 2010, 16). It’s my contention that the shortsightedness of 
organizational thinking is ultimately rooted in this tendency for 
individual minds to engage in biased future thinking. If we foresight 
practitioners concentrate our efforts on disrupting an organization’s image 
of the future without at the same time furnishing them with the tools to 
mitigate the inevitable slide back into flawed future thinking, then we fall 
short of the transformative effects of a strategic foresight engagement.   
But perhaps strategic foresight is not yet up to this more 
fundamental task. That the discipline of strategic foresight has historically 
lacked a serious engagement with the science of human foresight and 
decision making under uncertainty raises questions about how well it 
addresses the root of poor organizational future thinking. Considering 
strategic foresight in light of these research programs raises a host of 
fundamental questions about the received methodology: Does application 
of the Delphi method mitigate the individual biases of expert groups? 
Does the way scenarios are built adequately address the errors human 
beings naturally make when engaged in episodic future thinking? Do 
windtunnelling exercises encourage cognitive miserliness or focal biases 
instead of robust strategic thinking? Is foresight truly anyone’s game, or 
does effective foresight depend as much on the participation of 
individuals with certain types of knowledge and predispositions as it does 
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on the participants with adequate clout and decision-making power? In 
order to start uncovering answers to some of these more tactical questions 
regarding the strategic foresight methodology, this paper will focus on 
two fundamental questions in this space: 
What can we learn about the efficacy of strategic foresight by examining 
its methods in light of what scientists and researchers are learning about 
the function and limitations of human foresight? 
 
How might we use what we learn from these disciplines to transform 
strategic foresight into an evidence-based practice? 
 
For this paper, I used two research methods in order to explore 
these questions. I conducted a broad literature review surveying 
investigations into human foresight from several key scientific fields – 
including evolutionary anthropology, clinical psychology, and cognitive 
science – in order to discover how the strategic foresight methodology 
both succeeded and failed in accounting for the way that humans in fact 
think about the future. Second, I spoke with experts in each of these fields 
and in strategic foresight in order to get a better sense of how (or whether) 
these ideas were being synthesized and to test-drive the insights I’d 
uncovered in the course of my research. Conversation topics ranged from 
the state of the strategic foresight practice, to the natural limits of human 
foresight, to the systematic cognitive biases that impact foresight activities.   
I also spoke with two individuals representing different poles of a debate 
around how far we can and should attempt to extend human foresight to 
take account of larger periods of future time. The complete list of expert 
interviewees I spoke to in the course of this project is as follows: 
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• Peter Bishop (Assistant Professor, University of Houston, Future 
Studies) 
• Stuart Candy (Assistant Professor, OCAD University, Strategic 
Foresight and Innovation) 
• Jim Dator (Professor, University of Hawaii, Future Studies) 
• Mark P. Healey (Lecturer, Manchester Business School, Strategic 
Management) 
• Alexander Rose (Director, Long Now Foundation) 
• Douglas Rushkoff (Media Theorist) 
• Karl Schroeder (Senior Foresight Strategist, Idea Couture) 
• Keith Stanovich (Emeritus Professor, University of Toronto, 
Applied Psychology) 
• Thomas Suddendorf (Professor, University of Queensland, 
Psychology) 
• Maggie Toplak (Associate Professor, York University, 
Psychology) 
 
My claim is that at this point we simply don’t know the answers to 
the types of questions posed above because we haven’t yet done the work 
to connect the strategic foresight methodology to our growing scientific 
knowledge of the evolutionary history of human foresight and the 
research scientists have conducted around mental biases and use of 
heuristics in human future thinking. There’s much to be gained from 
working toward this synthesis. I believe it is the next logical step in 
transforming strategic foresight (not to mention many other sensemaking 
and decision making methodologies) into a discipline that is consonant 
with what we’re uncovering about the operations of the human mind.  
In the rest of this paper, I hope to provide a preliminary framework 
for conducting that synthesis, and point to concrete examples where 
foresight methods subvert their own aims through insensitivity to the 
ways humans naturally think about the future.
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2. THE ‘TWO SYSTEMS’ VIEW 	  
If we are going to recast foresight as a methodology for rooting out 
and addressing the biases and heuristics that impair the way we 
collectively conceive of and respond to the future, we must first establish a 
theoretical basis for understanding the multifarious ways our mind 
constructs and interprets the future. In this work, I will adopt the 
perspective developed in seminal works of cognitive psychology – most 
notably, the work of theorists and experimentalists like Daniel Kahneman, 
Amos Tversky, and Keith Stanovich– which hypothesizes that the human 
mind is broadly divided into two separate but interacting systems. Daniel 
Kahneman provides a succinct overview of the characteristics of these two 
systems in the opening pages of his book Thinking, Fast and Slow:  
System 1 (hereafter S1) operates automatically and quickly, with 
little or no effort and no sense of voluntary control. Processes of S1 are 
sub-personal in the  sense  that they do not depend on input from high-
level control systems (Stanovich et al 2010, 16). 
System 2 (hereafter S2) allocates attention to the effortful mental 
activities that demand it, including complex computations. The operations 
of S2 are often associated with the subjective experience of agency, choice 
and concentration (Kahneman 2011, 22). 
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S1 enables us, for instance, to automatically read the facial 
expressions of the people around us and parse their emotional states, 
orient ourselves to the source of a sudden sound, keep our car in the right 
lane while driving, compute simple arithmetic like 2 + 2, and step over 
uneven ground when hiking through the woods. Kahneman has described 
thoughts arising from S1 as automatic, and also as being unauthored.  
S2, in contrast, is associated with the subjective experience of 
labored thinking most people experience when they try to book a flight 
and hotel, multiply a two-digit number in their head, or recall the details 
of what they did last Tuesday. S2 is coextensive with mental work: its 
deliberate, effortful, and orderly. Thoughts arising from S2 come with the 
subjective feeling of having been authored by the subject. Because it is hard 
to author two things at once, S2 operations also have the hallmark of 
interfering with one another when we try to attend to them 
simultaneously. Our conscious mental working space quickly becomes 
overloaded when, for instance, we try to overtake a transport trailer on a 
narrow highway while having a conversation with our passenger about 
German Neo-Kantianism. This is why most passengers in that situation 
will naturally allow for a break in conversation as the driver executes a 
passing maneuver. “They know that distracting the driver is not a good 
idea,” writes Kahneman, “and they also suspect that he is temporarily 
deaf and will not hear what they say” (Kahneman 2011, 25). 
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There are a few important provisos to the “two systems” view of 
thinking. First, conceiving of the cognitive mind as comprising two 
distinct but interacting systems does not commit us to believing that they 
are separate physiological structures in the human mind. Not only is there 
is no evidence to support this claim, it would be trivial if true for a very 
important reason: with enough exposure and rehearsal, thinking that was 
once experienced as authored can become “the automatic firing of over-
learned associations” (Stanovich et al 2010, 18). Broadly speaking, this is 
what we mean by expert competency or knowledge. For instance, a car 
park attendant who backs vehicles into narrow spaces all day long will, 
over time, no longer experience significant mental effort when performing 
the task.4 The same can be said of individuals who have deep experience 
of the structure and operations of their organization and industry: they 
may no longer exert significant mental effort in either understanding or 
operating in the systems in which they’re embedded.   
Moreover, there is a strong tendency among individuals to defer to 
S1 whenever possible. As Keith Stanovich points out, this is simply a 
computational bias: S1 operations are cognitively easier to compute, so 
there is a strong prima facie case for defaulting to S1. This “cognitive 
miserliness” helps explain the tenacity of “my-side bias”, which is the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 However, there are physiological hallmarks of purposeful, active thinking. 
Individuals engaged in mental effort will tense up. Their heart rates increase, and 
their pupils dilate. This effect is incredibly reliable. By observing a close-up of a 
subject’s pupil, Kahneman and Tversky were able to accurately predict when 
they were was engaged in effortful mental tasks (Kahneman 2011, 34). 
 
	  15	  
tendency to implement knowledge that props up existing mental models 
and disregards disconfirming evidence: quite simply, “the easiest models 
to represent are those closest to what a person already believes and has 
modeled previously” (Ibid, 19). 
This brings us to an important, related note, which is that influence 
can, and often does, run in the opposite direction: thoughts that feel 
authored can actually be mere recapitulations of judgments rendered by 
S1. In this situation people are likely to confabulate purposeful reasons for 
their judgments; they hide the true origin of their judgments without 
knowing they’re doing so.  S2 – the authoring system that feels like you – 
may endorse a judgment rendered on the value of its cognitive 
affordability by S1 for an entirely ad hoc reason. In the domain of futuring, 
the pull of the default future might be as much about its computational 
affordability as it is about its assumed plausibility.  
All is not lost, however, because the processes of S2 can also be 
martialed to override those of S1. The innocuous system level description 
of this ability disguises the enormity of its import; using S2 to reign in S1 
is a drab operational description for no less than the ability for humans to 
exercise “rational self-determination” (Stanovich 2004, 275).  
We have already seen that S1 can pass judgments or make decisions 
that are anathema to our higher-level desires. This commonly occurs in 
instances where we individuals are said to be lacking willpower. For 
instance, the smell of Belgium waffles might trigger a desire in my S1 to 
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gorge on them. All things being equal, unless S2 intervenes with some 
higher level desire – such as “I want to stick to my diet”, or “I don’t want 
to have a sugar crash later” or “I want to live to see my seventieth 
birthday” – and a plan of action for circumventing S1 – such as “I’ll plug 
my nose till I’m around the block” or “I’ll reward myself with a handful of 
almonds later” or “I’ll just grit my teeth and keep walking” – then, all 
other things being equal, S1 is likely to get what it wants.  
Note just how many forces S1 can martial against slow and 
deliberative S2 in this situation. S1, as will see, is evolutionarily ancient. 
It’s rules for governing an organism’s behavior have been shaped and 
cemented over hundreds of millions of years of evolutionary history for 
the sole purpose of increasing reproductive success; S1’s that enacted 
underperforming or flimsy rules for guiding behavior in the evolutionary 
landscape simply didn’t make it into the next generation. It’s no wonder, 
then, that humans often find themselves acting without thinking, that 
strong emotional responses like fear and greed so strongly color their 
attempts to construct rational judgments, and that they have a hard time 
resisting impulses. 
Now, S1 really, really wants us to eat those Belgium waffles. Why? 
In the evolutionary landscape, humans needed as much fat as they could 
get in order to survive because it was a relatively scarce commodity (Pinel 
et al. 2000, 1109). Fat was mostly bound up in cognitively sophisticated, 
maneuverable, and rightfully suspicious quadrupeds that were not eager 
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to give up their fat stores to our human ancestors. So when humans did hit 
the fat jackpot it made good sense from the perspective of survival and 
reproduction to consume as much of it as possible: more fat was directly 
correlated with greater longevity and therefore, more opportunities for 
genetic reproduction.  
In addition, S1’s case for eating waffles is also strengthened by the 
aforementioned bias toward computational conservatism; deciding to eat 
the waffles is far less cognitively expensive than overriding this desire and 
then coming up with both reasons and strategies for abstaining. It is, quite 
literally, easier to give in to the urges emanating from S1’s desires.  
Perversely, S1 also gets a boost to its influence when S2 is engaged 
is some other deliberative task. Studies have shown that individuals who 
are given a psychologically demanding task and then tempted with an 
array of snacks will tend to choose fat and sugar laden items like candy 
and chocolate over items like carrot sticks and nuts (Kahneman 2011, 43). 
S1 is opportunistic; it waits for moments when S2 is occupied, and drives 
behavior toward its preferences. 
Lastly, the effects of words and messaging surrounding the 
Belgium waffles display can also bolster the influence of S1. If the word 
“Irresistible!” appears next to a photo of the waffles, this will subtly lessen 
the effectiveness of S2 in asserting its control over S1. This is why so much 
messaging and branding in advertising is aimed at S1: it’s far less 
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discerning a consumer than a properly functioning S2 enacting a project of 
rational self-determination.  
I use the example of waffles here because it is illustrative of how 
the cards are stacked against rational self-determination in a very familiar 
scenario. But this is not an isolated phenomenon; it’s cognitively and 
behaviorally global. Once we start looking it’s easy to find the influence of 
S1 and its attendant biases in all of our deliberations, from choosing a 
neighborhood to live in, to purchasing financial services, to building 
visions of the future and imagining how we might respond to them.  
The struggle within strategic foresight activities between deep-
seated biases and heuristics, on the one hand, and a program of rational 
self-determination, on the other, is therefore a very particular example of a 
general set of issues in human decision-making. That being said, I think 
there are two compelling reasons to re-examine foresight in light of the 
science of biases and heuristics. First, because foresight is a fairly well 
encapsulated methodology, we stand a reasonably good chance of 
building parameters, protocols, and checks into it that effectively reduce 
the irrational influence of S1 over the futures we construct, thereby 
improving the demonstrable utility of foresight engagements. Second, the 
stakes are high: powerful organizations whose actions have non-negligible 
impacts on global events are increasingly turning to foresight as a means 
to develop longer-term thinking and forward-facing strategies. There is a 
real danger for the both the viability of these organizations and the long-
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term outlook for humans generally if strategic foresight serves to amplify 
the judgments of S1 and furnish it with effective strategies for achieving 
its goals. S1 goals are not co-extensive with human goals, though since 
they have common evolutionary origins there are of course many places 
they overlap.5  If foresight is to be the preferred lens through which to 
view the future’s possibilities, we should do our best to ensure that lens 
isn’t seriously flawed.  
It’s doable, but it certainly won’t be easy. The literature exploring 
biases and heuristics from a “two system” approach is vast. Even selecting 
a subset of biases that are explicitly about future thinking does little to 
narrow the field. Here is a small sampling of a few such biases and 
heuristics: 
 Availability/unavailability heuristic: judging the probability of an 
event based on the ease or difficulty with which examples of it 
come to mind  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5 Some futurists are very worried about the possibility that future AGI (artificial 
general intelligence) will lack goals that are properly scaled to human goals. The 
potential design space for minds, they point out, is likely unimaginably vast. 
Human minds (and their attendant goals) occupy a vanishingly small point in 
that space. The likelihood that any recursively self-improving intelligent agent 
will develop goals that map to human goals is very poor, and we should 
therefore expect that an AGI will enact many of its goals at the expense of human 
flourishing, in much the same way that Joe’s goal to get chips at the corner store 
is achieved at the expense of the flourishing of ant colonies living next to the 
sidewalk. I do not think their concerns are unfounded, but I would simply point 
out that we are already grappling with this problem, except that instead of 
contending with AGIs we are up against genetic and memetic interests nested in 
our own bodies and minds.  See Stanovich (2004) for a thorough exposition of 
this position.  
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 Hot hand fallacy: misperceiving stretches of uniformity consistent 
with randomness in a sequence as evidence for a “hot streak”, also 
known as the gambler’s fallacy 
 Impact bias: the tendency to overestimate the length or intensity of 
future  feeling states 
 Planning fallacy: a tendency to underestimate the length of time 
required to complete a task 
 Sunk cost fallacy: justifying the assigning of additional resources 
to a project based primarily on the amount of resources that it has 
already been allocated 
 Status quo bias: adopting the current baseline as a reference point, 
and perceiving any change from that baseline in either direction as 
a loss 
 Overrepresentation of these biases and heuristics will cause us to 
commit errors in generating useful mental images of the future and 
planning around them accordingly.  
We are all subject to these biases. Any, or all, of them can influence 
the formulation and use of foresight scenarios and strategies in ways that 
reduce their thoroughness, credibility, and usefulness, or worse, that lead 
to strategic decisions which are antithetical to the organization’s goals, or 
even to human goals broadly conceived. In this sense, and in the context of 
foresight, thinking clearly about the future and the way we ought to respond to it 
is therefore synonymous with developing clearly authored, reasonably de-
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biased visions of the future and formulating explicitly rational human-regarding 
strategies for flourishing within whatever future we happen to get.   
This is, of course, an ideal state of affairs that will require 
considerable rejigging of the methodology and its guiding framework. In 
the interim, it is essential that we begin the conversations that will bridge 
this gap in understanding between what we’re learning about our native 
foresight abilities and the foresight methodologies that purport to make us 
better at thinking about the future.  
We have nowhere to go but up: as Ronald Bradfield points out in 
his review of cognitive barriers to scenario development, as it stands 
“[foresight] practitioners at large … appear generally unaware of, or at 
best only vaguely aware of, these phenomena and their ramifications on 
the scenario development process” (Bradfield 2008, 14), and the influential 
evolutionary psychologists and cognitive scientists I’ve approached for 
interviews in this project have likewise professed an ignorance of the 
strategic foresight methodology. It’s time to change this state of affairs. We 
might begin with a survey of exactly what evolutionary psychologists are 







3.  A NATURAL HISTORY OF 
PROSPECTION 	  
  The cornerstone of strategic foresight is an exploration of the 
human ability to perform feats of future-oriented mental time travel. So far 
as we can tell, humans might well be the only creatures on earth that can 
“pre-experience the future by simulating it in our minds” (Gilbert 2007, p. 
1352).6 The practice also appears to be something we engage in more often 
than even we might realize. Humans obsessively think about the future; 
mental simulation of the future, or prospection, consumes “nearly a third 
of our spontaneous cognition at rest and supports a range of adaptive 
behaviors, from planning to problem solving” (Race et al 2013, 1), which is 
an important indicator of its centrality to our success as a species.  
  But even though we are overachieving future thinkers, we 
shouldn’t lose sight of the fact that the human ability to imagine potential 
future scenarios that are decoupled from their representation of the 
present doesn’t come from nowhere. Future-oriented mental travel is an 
ability constructed on the scaffolding of much older prospective abilities 
that originate deep in our evolutionary history and support various 
degrees of planning and problem solving capacities. It is therefore 
worthwhile, before discussing how the strategic foresight methodology 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 There is a healthy debate about whether other animals have the ability for 
mental time travel. Scrub jays, for instance, exhibit behaviors that suggest they 
have some sense of themselves continuing into the future, and can act in ways 
that take into account their future (as opposed to current) drive states. For a 
survey of the evidence, see Suddendorf and Corballis (2007).  
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both supports and inhibits effective and de-biased mental time travel, to 
take a look into the evolutionary history of prospection. This will help us 
understand both its structure and historical function, and locate potential 
strengths and weakness in the scaffolding of which we should be mindful 
when considering how we might augment and extend the foresight 
methodology. Ultimately, our goal should be to shape foresight to drive 
the conversion of automatic, rash, and sub-personal System 1 processes 
into careful, deliberative, and self-aware System 2 processes.  
 First, we’ll investigate some the of peculiarities of the machinery of 
prospection, and consider evidence for the theory that memory and 
prospection share much of the same machinery and so cannot easily be 
considered in abstraction from each other; in fact, there is good reason to 
postulate a mirrored prospection system for each of the different types of 
human memory. This is called the Janus Hypothesis, and it informs the 
structure given to human prospection in this chapter. As we’ll see, absent 
serious injuries or diseases most people are able to deploy procedural, 
semantic, and episodic foresight when conceiving of and responding to the 
future. However, the picture becomes more complicated when we 
consider the shared machinery of memory and prospection. The ability to 
think about the future is not well compartmentalized from memory in the 
human mind; an important fact that suggests we look closely at the use 
and misuse of notions of time in foresight exercises.  
 After a discussion of the Janus Hypothesis, we’ll survey the current 
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thinking about the three different broad foresight systems, corresponding 
to established and well-researched memory systems: procedural foresight, 
which encompasses the set of automatic and stereotyped responses to 
imminent future events; semantic foresight, which enables script-based, 
depersonalized investigation and planning for the future based on both 
acquired and implicit knowledge; and episodic foresight, which enables the 
development of ego-centered – or autonoetic – scenarios, effectively placing 
future scenarios on an individual’s future timeline. 
 Finally, I will discuss how individual differences in temporal 
orientation is an added important wrinkle to the complexity of foresight. 
There are considerable differences to consider in the way individuals are 
oriented to time, which can impact their contributions to foresight 
activities and amplify (or, with careful planning, dampen) bias in group 
ideation and strategizing. 
 3.1 The Janus Hypothesis  	  
 As Thomas Suddendorf and Michael Corbalis point out in their 
seminal work on the evolution of foresight, while episodic memory – the 
reliving of past events – has been the topic of intense research efforts, “the 
mental construction of potential future episodes has only very recently 
begun to draw attention” (Suddendorf & Corbalis 2007, 299).  
 Granted, there is strong evidence to suggest that both abilities are 
enabled by many of the same cognitive resources. To us, time might seem 
as though it stretches out in two different directions, both into the past 
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and future. But it seems that our brain itself is less sensitive to the 
difference, since it mobilizes much of the same machinery when dealing 
with one or the other. Thomas Suddendorf, a psychologist who has drawn 
attention to this surprising feature of the brain, calls this ‘The Janus 
Hypothesis’ after the Roman god with two faces on opposite sides of his 
head, one staring into the past and the other into the future. The human 
brain, like Janus, seems to recycle at least some aspects of its temporal 
perspective on events and facts, whether what it is ‘looking at’ is ‘behind’ 
it or ‘ahead’ of it in time. 
 	  
Figure 1. The Roman God Janus 
 Some compelling evidence for the hypothesis can be found by 
studying individuals who’ve had catastrophic injuries that have left with 
unable to form new memories. Molaison – or H.M., as he is known in the 
literature of psychology – is the most well known subject in the history of 
the study of memory. As a teenager, H.M. underwent brain surgery to 
treat his constant, debilitating epileptic seizures. The surgery was 
successful in treating his condition, but left him with serious memory 
deficits. Most conspicuously, he became virtually unable to form new 
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episodic memories: those memories of events in our lives that we draw on 
when, for instance, relating what we did on our vacation last week. H.M.’s 
episodic memory was so impaired that such a recollection was beyond 
him. By the early afternoon of any given day he was completely clueless 
as to what he may have done with his morning. New semantic memory – 
the explicit knowledge of new facts – also seemed to elude him; due to 
significant retrograde amnesia, his knowledge of world events dried up 
during the period several years before his surgery. (He could, however, 
acquire new procedural memories – the body memory that motor skills 
like piano playing and painting are built upon – although he’d have no 
recollection of how he might’ve learned them). 
 As for his view of the future: when asked what he thought he might 
do tomorrow, H.M. evaded the question with the odd nondescript reply, 
“Whatever’s beneficial.” In much the same way that H.M. was unable to 
conjure specific scenarios from his past, he could neither construct 
potential scenarios of his future, even those that were relatively 
immediate. 
 Edwin Tulving, an influential pioneer the study of memory in 
cognitive psychology, was the first researcher to notice the deep link 
between memory and foresight. His insight also came from his study of a 
brain-injured patient. N.N., as the man was known, still had memory for 
basic facts about the world (unlike H.M.), and even retained the ability to 
learn new skills. But N.N.’s memory of the episodes of his own life was 
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completely lost to him. Curiously, Tulving noticed that his ability to 
imagine potential future episodes in his life – even innocuous ones, like 
his plans for the following day – was similarly extinguished. Science 
writer Carl Zimmer reports on an exchange between N.N. and Tulving 
that demonstrates the extent of the former’s impairment (Zimmer 2011). 
 Tulving: What will you be doing tomorrow? 
 N.N.: (long pause) I don’t know. 
 Tulving: Do you remember the question? 
 N.N.: About what I’ll be doing tomorrow?  
 Tulving: Yes. How would you describe your state of mind when 
you try to think  about it? 
 N.N.: (long pause) Blank, I guess. It’s like being in a room with 
nothing there and  having a guy tell you to go find a chair.  
 
 It seems that, as the memory of the past is lost, so too goes 
anticipation for the future. Both H.M. and N.N. were stranded in the 
present, with no stories to tell or plans for the future.  
  At first glance, the structural features hinted at in the Janus 
Hypothesis seem like a poor way for our brains to deal with two very 
different domains of inquiry. The past is the domain of certainties, and the 
future that of uncertainties. Why, then, do our brains seem to mix them 
together? 
 The messy way we conceive of the past and future only begins to 
make sense when we understand that our brains weren’t built to grasp at 
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objective reality, but rather to get us through the next day and, more 
importantly, get our genetic material into the next generation. Objectivity 
is a scientific concept, and scientists didn’t build our brains. The shared 
machinery of past and future in our minds is instead the result of a 
persistent tinkerer: biological evolution. As psychologist Gary Marcus 
might say, our natural foresight ability is a hacked-together 
evolutionary kluge: a quick (at least on evolutionary time scales) and cheap 
solution to the pressing problem of navigating a complex social and 
physical environment, and a clumsy and inelegant solution to the problem 
of anticipating the future (Marcus 2008).  
 The evolutionary understanding of future thinking also suggests 
another remarkable hypothesis: when you consider the boost to 
evolutionary fitness – an animal’s likelihood of survival and reproduction 
– foresight confers, it seems more likely that the ability to construct 
memories of the past exists primarily to serve as input into the foresight 
process, a perspective Suddendorf himself echoed in conversation: “The 
past is totally irrelevant unless it impacts survival and fitness,” he said, 
“and from a fitness perspective what matters is foresight (Suddendorf 
2014). In other words, we might only have memory of the past for the sake 
of helping us better understand and plan for the future: a stunning 
inversion, considering the amount of psychological research that has been 
conducted on human memory, and the relative scarcity of studies on 
human foresight. 
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 There is some intriguing evidence for this hypothesis. As vision 
scientist Stanley Klein and his co-researches suggest, if the primary 
function of memory is to assist in planning for an uncertain but potentially 
controllable the future, than we should expect it to be more efficient when 
its employed for this purpose relative to other tasks (Klein et al 2010, 14). 
In order to test this hypothesis, they randomized subjects to four different 
encoding conditions – past, atemporal, planning, and surviving - which 
were variations on a prompt of how one would go about deciding which 
items from a prepopulated list to bring on a camping trip: past encoding 
prompted participants to remember a specific time in their past that they 
had camped, atemporal encoding prompted them to use their imagination to 
form a picture of a campsite in a forest, planning encoding prompted them 
to imagine that they were making plans to take a camping trip, and 
survival encoding prompted them to imagine that they are stranded in a 
forest without any basic survival material. After completing the portion 
and a short distraction exercise involving completing anagrams, subjects 
were prompted to recall the words they had been asked to prioritize at the 
beginning of the experiment. A comparison of the mean recall achieved on 
each encoding task found that subjects performed best when primed with 
planning encoding, followed by survival encoding, atemporal encoding, 
and lastly past encoding. That the biggest recall gap uncovered in the 
experiment was between past encoding and future encoding bafflingly 
suggests that we are least good at using memory when thinking about the 
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past itself (Ibid, 17). 7 This is the opposite result we should expect if 
memory’s function was to record the past in a purely reproductive 
manner, like a video camera. But if we understand memory is primarily 
designed for future planning rather than reminiscence, than its distortions 
and shortcomings make sense: “natural selection can only work on what 
memory can offer for present and future fitness rather than on the 
accuracy of past record per se” (Suddendorf et al. 2009, 1317).  
 So while memory and prospection are deeply physiological linked, 
there are also interesting asymmetries in their functioning. It seems 
reasonable to assume that the relevant pressure that gave rise to this 
asymmetry is the directionality of time perception itself; our ability to 
process and plan around temporality was no doubt shaped by 
relationship with time, in which, as philosopher Hans Reichenbach 
observed: “There are no past impossibilities and there are no future facts” 
(Reichenbach 1951, 241).   
 Simply put, the brain treats past and present similarly because it’s 
convenient for it to do so, and the mistakes that accrue as a result of the 
overlap weren’t enough to get us killed in the ancestral world before we 
could produce offspring. It seems clear, however, that our myopic 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 The atemporal encoding used in this experiment closely resembles the 
“scripting” style of planning that relies primarily on semantic memory. I suggest 
later in this paper that foresight based on scripting is less memorable and more 
prone to a specific raft of biases that leads us to underimagine the future. But it is 
intriguing to note here that scripting makes even memories seem less memorable, 
which is further evidence for the Janus Hypothesis.  
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foresight abilities can get us into quite a lot of trouble in the modern 
world, as we’ll see in the final chapter.  
  The current dominant paradigm of memory studies postulates 
three separate, interacting memory systems in human beings: procedural 
memory, semantic memory, and episodic memory. Proceeding on the 
assumption that the Janus Hypothesis is true, I will explore some of what 
we know about the prospective counterparts of each of these memory 
systems, in order to give us a better sense of the origins of the many biases 
we are subject to when thinking about the future.  
	  
Figure 2. The memory and prospection systems. The common taxonomy of memory 
systems (left), after Squire (1992), and its proposed prospective counterpart (right). The 
figure illustrates the Janus hypothesis, which is that procedural memory, semantic 
memory, and episodic memory each has mirrored counterparts in our foresight abilities. 
(Suddendorf & Corballis 2007, 301) 
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 3.2. Procedural Foresight 
 
 The evolutionary development of prospection is a long and 
complex tale with one simple driving force: selection pressure. We begin 
the story (which we can only retell in broad overview here) with an 
account of procedural memory.  
 Certain types of futures – namely, those that were imminent and 
portended highly regular or very probable consequences – were so 
influential on the evolutionary path taken by our distant ancestors that we 
have inherited their clever strategies for coping with those futures in the 
form of hard-wired behaviors.  
 When we think of the structures that enable the guidance of 
behavior in animals, we naturally think of brains. Brains, as philosopher 
Daniel Dennett succinctly put it, are anticipation machines: their primary 
purpose is to “produce future.” (Dennett 1996, p. 177) In the evolution of 
life on planet Earth, the development of brains is a particularly elegant 
solution to the problem of navigating and surviving a complex 
environment. But brains are far from the only solution, and perhaps aren’t 
even the most common one deployed in the whole of evolutionary history. 
Some organisms, like coconut trees and clams, employ an “armor and 
wait” survival strategy. Others – cnidarians like coral and jellyfish – 
evolved diffuse, highly interconnected neural nets, which register and 
respond to threats and opportunities through no other channel but 
physical touch (Ginsburg 2008, p. 223). A jellyfish won’t withdraw its 
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tentacles in response to a potential impact, only an actual one. These are not 
future-facing flora and fauna. Plants, protists, fungi, eubacteria, and 
archaebacteria: the brainless kingdoms in the domain of eukaryotic life are 
completely incurious about the future. They live instead in an immediate, 
unextended now.  
 Even the seemingly complex behavior of brained and mildly 
future-regarding animals often disguises a series of inflexible behavioral 
triggers that respond to immediate, temporally unextended stimuli. Ticks, 
for example, will find a high perch and remain there indefinitely, or until 
the smell of butyric acid, secreted by the skin of all mammals, triggers 
them to loosen their grip and drop down from their perch. Landing on 
some solid surfaces extinguishes the first behavior and serves as a cue to 
initiate a search for heat. When the tick locates a warm spot, this serves as 
a third environmental trigger, and the tick begins burrowing down 
toward the source of the heat. Each response is law-governed and doesn’t 
allow for cognitive flexibility (Carruthers 2000, 124). Jacob von Uexkull, 
who wrote imaginatively about the perceptual worlds (Umwelt) of many 
creatures – evocatively describes the tick’s world: “The whole rich world 
around the tick shrinks and changes into a scanty framework consisting, 
in essence, of three receptor cues and three effector cues – her Umwelt. But 
the very poverty of this world guarantees the unfailing certainty of her 
actions, and security is more important than wealth” (Von Uexkull 1934, 
12). 
	  34	  
 Even the most rudimentary forms of procedural foresight inch the 
life of the mind forward in time; whereas animals like jellyfish and coral 
need to wait for physical contact in order to initiate behaviors and build 
sensitivities and habituations, animals that anticipate imminent future 
states behave with respect to possibilities. The space opened up between 
now and the imminent future is where planning – or perhaps more 
accurately, protoplanning – begins. Protoplanning is interesting from the 
perspective of foresight because it marks the moment that images of the 
future, the stated quarry of strategic foresight, enter onto the evolutionary 
scene.   
 It is hard to understate how seemingly miraculous is the 
decoupling of behavior from immediacy. “When a mouse hides before a 
cat enters the room,” writes psychologist Dan Gilbert, “it is responding to 
an event that has not happened yet, and its ability to do so is one of 
evolution’s most remarkable achievements.” (Gilbert & Wilson 2007, p. 
1351) The mouse can’t of course, see the future in which it is eaten by the 
cat. However, it can take action now in such a way as to reduce the 
possibility of being caught flat-footed in such a future.   
 But we shouldn’t confuse all that appears to be procedural foresight 
with planning. All that is necessary for procedural foresight is that an 
organism’s behavior be “modulated by experience such that the organism 
gains a future advantage”. Procedural foresight therefore only enables 
learning with reference to the “current indicators of upcoming events”; it 
	  35	  
is “stimulus-bound, or better, bound to the perceptual tracking of stimuli” 
(Suddendorf et al 2007, 300). Stimulus-bound responses are often referred 
to as instincts or fixed action patterns. We should not lose sight of the fact 
that future advantage can be – and often is – achieved through mindless 
behaviour.  
Take the complex choreography of the female digger wasp (also known as 
Sphex ichneumoneus) as she prepares to lay and hatch her eggs. Keith 
Stanovich relates the complex sequence of actions: 
First she digs a burrow. Then she flies off looking for a cricket. 
When she finds a suitable one she stings it in a way that paralyzes it 
but does not kill it. She brings the cricket back to the burrow and 
sets it just outside at the threshold of the burrow. Then she goes 
inside to make sure things are safe and in proper order inside the 
burrow. If they are, she then goes back outside and drags in the 
paralyzed cricket. She then lays her eggs inside the burrow, seals it 
up, and flies away. When the eggs hatch, the wasp grubs feed off 
the paralyzed cricket which has not decayed because it was 
paralyzed rather than killed (Stanovich 2004, 74-75) 
 
 The complexity of the digger wasp’s behaviour is no doubt 
impressive. But something strange happens when experimenters add 
barriers or interruptions to the wasp’s dance. For instance, if when the 
wasp descends into her burrow to make sure it is safe an experimenter 
moves the paralyzed grasshopper an inch or two away from the burrow’s 
edge, the wasp will come out of her burrow, drag the grasshopper again 
to the edge, and then go once more into the hole to check its safety.  If the 
grasshopper is moved again, the wasp will again repeat the same 
behaviour. In one experiment, “the wasp checked the burrow forty times 
and would still not drag the cricket straight in” (Ibid, 75). Although it may 
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seem to us as though the wasp is engaged in complex planning to secure 
the future viability of its offspring, in reality it is going through a set of 
actions “choreographed by rigid and inflexible preprogrammed responses 
to specific stimuli in the Sphex environment” (Ibid, 75). 
 Reflecting on the complex, yet mechanized, behaviour of digger 
wasps, philosopher Daniel Dennett refers to “that spooky sense one often 
gets when observing or learning about insects and other lower animals: all 
that bustling activity but there’s nobody home!” (Dennett 1984, 13). 
Dennett also suggests that the proto-planning behaviour of the wasp also 
holds up a mirror to our own behaviour: “What makes you sure you’re 
not sphexish – at least a little bit” (Ibid, 11)? 
 Dennett’s is right to ask; we are sphexish, and often more than just 
a little bit. These types of sphexish procedural foresight strategies, of 
course, persist in humans, and are still highly persuasive in the situational 
domains in which they were shaped. The ducking reflex is one such 
strategy. Ducking, as it turns out, is a particularly robust strategic 
response to a possible future where one is struck in the head by, say, a 
hurled rock. Those individuals who failed to execute ducking strategies in 
a timely matter – and there must have been many of them – left fewer 
offspring with poor ducking skills. 
 Another inherited strategy based on prospecting imminent threats 
is the phenomenon of hypnic jerk. Many people, when on the verge of 
sleep, experience a sudden falling sensation that triggers an involuntary 
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startle reflex. One hypothesis for the tight causal coupling of the falling 
sensation with a spastic flailing of the limbs is that those of our tree 
dwelling ancestors who quickly roused themselves from sleep and flailed 
their limbs were more likely to catch a branch and avoid being maimed or 
killed by impact with the ground. As a consequence of our ancestors’ 
slowly acquired ability for effective prospection and anticipation, we 
moderns are naturally good at not being hit in the head by foul balls or 
falling out of our chairs when we doze off. 
 But even these deeply rooted, imminent future-oriented strategies 
can be misapplied. Note that while the ducking reflex is most often good 
futuring, the hypnic jerk is most often an example of misfuturing; generally, 
when we reflexively duck, it’s because we were really in some danger of 
being knocked on the head (or at least a near collision). But while relaxing 
in bed, we likely aren’t in any real danger of a fatal ground impact.8 
 Again, the examples of ducking and hypnic jerk here are meant to 
be evocative illustrations of a general principle: procedural foresight 
strategies can cause us to underrepresent the future and blind us to 
possibilities. An example that more directly impacts the practice of 
foresight is the implicit set of procedural strategies encoded in emotional 
content.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 It’s easy to imagine scenarios where the reverse is true. Moviegoers who duck 
when three-dimensional objects rush at them are misfuturing. And if you 
experience hypnic jerk because you and your bed have just sailed out of a 10th 
story window, well, that’s good futuring. 
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 Emotions are not action agnostic; they carry specific hardwired, 
evolutionary adapted “action tendencies” or implicit goals, the purpose of 
which is to “save cognitive processing by triggering time-tested responses 
to universal experiences (such as loss, injustice, and threat)” (Lowenstein 
and Lerner 2003, 628). The limit case of extreme emotional agitation or 
stress is instructive. As emotions intensify, they exert an ever-stronger 
tendency to over-ride rational deliberation and consideration. Reflecting 
on the influence of intense emotions on their actions, people often report 
that they have felt “out of control”, or even as if they were “acting against 
their own self-interest” (Baumeister et al 1994, 183).9  
 In a striking experiment, psychologist Dan Ariely asked 
heterosexual undergraduate males a series of questions about whether 
they’d engage in immoral and risky behaviors for the purposes of 
increasing their chances of having a sexual encounter. The men completed 
the survey twice, once in a state of self-reported sexual arousal, and again 
in an un-aroused state. The experiment found that, while in a state of 
arousal, the men surveyed were more likely to report a willingness to lie 
to dates, to encourage them to consume more alcohol, or even to drug 
them if it would increase their chances of having sex. Incredibly, the men 
surveyed consistently under-predicted the effect that arousal would have on 
their judgments. “Across the board,” Ariel writes, “they revealed in their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Opponents of two systems theories of cognition would do well to ask 
themselves in light of this example: are these individuals simply mistaken in 
their belief that they weren’t acting in their own best interest in a heated 
moment? If not, then in the interest of who or what were they acting?  
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unaroused state that they themselves did not know what they were like once 
aroused” (Ariely 2008, 97).  
 In more moderate levels of intensity, emotions and stress appear to 
play an advisory, rather than a dictatorial, role. In these cases, emotions act 
as information input into decision-making process. In many cases, the 
advisory role of emotion is legitimate. For example, assessing how you 
feel now is a relevant input into your decision regarding whether to see a 
movie this evening. Still, if the contribution of an emotion or stress state to 
judgment making is not explicitly recognized, its influence can become 
tacitly endorsed in an individual’s supposedly authored judgments 
without their knowing. 
  A study of experienced parole judges in Israel found that the rate at 
which they granted parole to prisoners slowly declined from a rate of 65% 
to almost zero throughout morning sessions. After a food break, the rate at 
which they granted paroles again rose to around 65% (Danziger et al. 
2011, 6890). The authors conclude that “making repeated rulings can 
increase the likelihood of judges to simplify their decisions”, and that 
“they will be more likely to accept the default, status quo outcome: deny a 
prisoner’s request” (Ibid, 6889). While they might not be dictatorial, 
unacknowledged mildly and moderately intense emotional states, it 
seems, can still exert a powerful Machiavellian influence on our decision-
making.  
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 The act of building multiple representations of the future, as we 
have seen, is computationally expensive, and it is often a bad strategy in 
time intensive situations. Stereotyped, low cost, low risk strategies based 
on shallow, automatic analysis of events were often the better strategic 
option in these types of situations. There is good reason to believe 
therefore, that decision-making under time-sensitive, stressful, or 
emotional conditions will create biases toward drawing on unauthored 
procedural foresight strategies. As Daniel Gilbert writes: “People use their 
immediate hedonic reactions to simulations as predictors of the hedonic 
reactions they are likely to have when the events they are simulating 
actually come about” (Gilbert et al 2007, 1352). And even if individuals 
subsequently adjust their outlook to take account of the time that will 
elapse between now and the event being simulated, they are still apt to 
use their immediate hedonic reaction as an anchor for judgment. As a 
result, “when we attempt to predict our future feelings, we expect our 
future to feel a bit more like our present than it actually will. (Gilbert 2006, 
151)” 
  The tradeoff between the security and reliability of automatic 
decision-making and the wealth of possible representations of future 
states is a recurring theme in evolution, and indeed in the minds of 
humans. These emotions and reactions are common enough in the process 
of group decision making that it is worth investigating the extent of their 
impact and developing processes to mitigate their effect.  
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 3.3 Semantic Foresight 
 
 The roots of procedural foresight, as we’ve discussed, are 
evolutionarily ancient, and so we naturally share many of its mechanisms 
with distant cousins like tree shrews and toucans that arguably lack the 
flexible communication skills and robust self-awareness of humans. We 
have seen that it is possible to get by without even procedural foresight in 
situations where organisms only need to employ very regular and 
stereotyped responses to a static environment. However, procedural 
foresight becomes indispensible in environments that impose large 
penalties – such as starvation, dismemberment, and death – when 
organisms misread the imminent future.  
 Procedural foresight encompasses all those aspects of our future-
oriented cognition that can’t be explicitly verbalized in language; in the 
parlance of cognitive science, it is a non-declarative set of skills. 
Declarative foresight – a category which covers both semantic foresight 
and episodic foresight – is more flexible than procedural foresight, because 
it can “be triggered top-down from the frontal lobes, rather than bottom 
up through perception” (Miyashita 2004, 435). In other words, whereas 
procedural foresight is always attached to the current context, organisms 
with semantic and episodic foresight capacities can employ them more or 
less at will (hence the “declarative” moniker) in order to simulate the 
future. Next, we will consider both of these declarative foresight abilities 
in turn.  
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 Semantic foresight is the ability to use our knowledge of the world in 
order to construct depersonalized scripts of how future events might 
unfold; if (as we’ll see) episodic foresight is “projecting into” the future, 
semantic foresight is “knowing about” the future. In Klein’s experiment 
described above, for instance, the participants’ abstract knowledge about 
events that are likely to happen during a camping trip, and things it’d be 
handy to have in those situations, are both examples of semantic 
knowledge. With respect to the future, it is possible that our conception of 
how it unfolds “is predominately derived from what could be termed 
“script-based” knowledge – our knowledge of familiar, routine events” 
(Atance et al. 2005, 127). This may go a long way to explaining the 
seeming ubiquity of the planning fallacy: because the future is only 
rendered in script, it’s easy to underestimate the time and resources 
necessary to complete tasks in a predetermined schedule and to imagine 
the task taking place “in a vacuum” without unexpected setbacks.  
 Semantic foresight is much more rare than procedural foresight, in 
part because it appears to depend on the presence of brain structures that 
are underdeveloped or absent in much of the animal kingdom, especially 
the frontal and pre-frontal cortex. There are, of course, no straight lines in 
nature. Deciding whether some instance of foresight in animals is merely 
procedural or amounts to semantic or episodic foresight is difficult to do.  
 The study of prospection in rats provides a good example. Rats 
move around a maze or meadow they encode a map of the territory in 
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their hippocampus. Neurons there become active as the rats pass through 
touch points in their journey, and the same neurons will fire again in the 
same sequence if they pass through the same territory again. Remarkably, 
when the rats stop for rest, readings from their hippocampus suggest that 
they are both rapidly replaying their route and imagining themselves 
running in different directions, “projecting themselves into different 
futures to help them decide where to go next” (Zimmer 2011; Redish et al. 
2007).  
 But what kind of representation of the future are these rats using? 
It’s hard to say. While there is no evidence to suggest that rats possess 
autonoetic consciousness – a sense of themselves as situated in a personal 
timeline stretching from past to future – there are experimental results 
suggesting rats may have the ability to reflect on their own semantic 
knowledge about the world when making decisions (Foote 2007, 551; 
Buckner et al 2006, 54-55). 
 The opacity of mental life is a key difficulty to assessing the results 
of both laboratory behaviour experiments and strategic foresight activities, 
among other things. 
If there is a general rule of thumb regarding semantic foresight, it’s this: if 
a problem can’t be solved through procedural foresight, and if an 
individual can develop a course of action without having to imagine their 
personal future in detail, then they will do so. This is in keeping with the 
principle of cognitive miserliness identified by Stanovich et al.: “We often 
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make the easiest (incorrect) inference from the information given and do 
not proceed with the more difficult (but correct) inference that would 
follow from considering all of the possibilities” (Stanovich 2010, 18). When 
it comes to foresight, concerns of computational conservatism will often 
trump those of thoroughness. 
 There is a cluster of heuristics surrounding semantic foresight that 
will tend to make people more reliant on script-based futures. First, scripts 
are usually constructed in domains with which we have a great deal of 
familiarity. Because things that are familiar to individuals naturally come 
to mind more easily than things with which they aren’t familiar, we 
should expect them to employ an availability heuristic or ‘my-side bias’ 
when judging the course of the future. Simply put, futures that include a 
place for the knowledge that they’ve scripted through experience and 
exposure will come to mind more easily than those that do not rely on this 
knowledge, and we know from experimental findings that individuals 
mistakenly conflate ease of recall with greater plausibility (Ibid, 19). 
 The affect heuristic is also at work in semantic foresight. Optimistic 
scenarios will be disproportionately based on the results of semantic 
foresight because a more detailed analysis in most cases would render any 
given scenario less optimistic, since the increased contextual information 
might introduce blockers. Since thinking about optimistic scenarios feels 
good, we should also expect a strong emotional bias toward endorsing the 
results of semantic foresight (Mesoudi 2007).  
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 Understanding the creation and use of script-based, semantic 
foresight, and the biases and heuristics attached to this type of 
prospection, can help us to formulate the ontology of default futures in 
organizations and learn how to better combat them.  
 
 3.4 Episodic Foresight 	  
 Investigating the evolution of episodic foresight – or episodic 
future thinking – has become a cottage industry since the publication of 
Suddendorf and Corballis’ 2007 landmark call to arms for research in the 
area (Suddendorf & Corballis 2007). As the authors point out in that 
survey, while episodic memory has been the focus of intense research 
interest since the pioneering work of Edward Tulving, “mental 
construction of potential future episodes has only very recently begun to 
draw attention. (Ibid, 299)” Due to the relative youth of the field, much of 
what it has uncovered has yet to make it into the practice of strategic 
foresight despite the potential it has to transform the practice.  
 As we might expect, in light of the Janus Hypothesis our abilities 
for episodic foresight bears commonalities with our abilities for episodic 
memory. As in the case of episodic memory, the ability for episodic 
foresight appears to be contingent on possessing what Tulving calls 
autonoetic consciousness, which is “the kind of consciousness that mediates 
an individual’s awareness of his or her existence and identity in subjective 
time extending from the personal past through the present to the personal 
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future”, creating the “characteristic phenomenal flavor of the experience” 
(Tulving 1985, 1). But what does autonoetic consciousness substantively 
add to our ability to cope with the future? In order to make its 
contribution clear, let’s quickly recapitulate the contribution of each type 
of foresight to our ability to grasp the future.  
 Procedural foresight is stimulus bound, and so is largely inflexible 
to contextual information; place an audio device with continuous 
playback of the sound of running water in a beaver’s territory, and the 
animal will cover it with sticks and mud in an attempt to dam it up 
(Richard 1983, 107). If the beaver could articulate semantic knowledge 
about the world – for instance, about what running water looks like apart 
from what it sounds like – it may be able to render a judgment that 
building a dam in this situation is inappropriate and so not engage in dam 
building behaviour.  
 Semantic foresight allows for more flexibility in planning, but due 
to the low resolution afforded by mere knowledge without experiential 
context, it can also fall short in certain situations. The Bischoff-Köhler 
hypothesis states that animals other than humans are unable to decouple 
their representations of the future from their current goal states, such as 
securing food or sex. The inability to imagine themselves in goal states 
other than the one they are pursuing currently – in other words, to engage 
in episodic future thinking – means that their plans can only support their 
current activities (Raby & Clayton 2008, 318). We have already seen a 
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similar planning deficit in humans with brain injuries who have lost the 
ability for episodic foresight but not semantic foresight. Those individuals 
might be able to provide a script for activities like going to a restaurant, 
but the task of marrying that script to a personal plan for the future seems 
insurmountable to them.  
 Episodic foresight adds another level of resolution to planning. 
With it, we can simulate ourselves in the future, in different contexts, 
facing different challenges, and pursuing different goal states. This affords 
the ability to finely tune our behaviour in anticipation of responding to 
multiple possible futures in which we may find ourselves; with this 
capability, we can “make specific plans, and compare different scenarios” 
in order to develop contingencies and rehearse responses (Suddendorf et 
al 2009, 1321). Similar to how episodic memory allows us to re-experience 
our past, “episodic future thinking allows us to pre-experience our future” 
(Atance & O’Neill 2001). The best way to understand episodic foresight is 
as a further improvement on both procedural and semantic foresight that 
allows for the further fine-tuning of behaviour, a third “dial” that allows 
us to modulate our response to the future by shifting the temporal and 
situational context of our actions. Unlike other animals, we can decouple 
both our knowledge of the worlds and ourselves from the present moment.  
 Episodic future thinking is an incredibly powerful tool. So 
powerful that as “perhaps the only species with such foresight, humans 
alone may be driven to consciously guide the planet into the future and 
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thus be burdened with the responsibility of getting it right” (Suddendorf 
& Corballis 2007, 312; Dawkins 2000). At the same time, it is also an 
incredibly risky tool to employ. Consider, as Keith Stanovich related to 
me, that hypothetical thinking demands that we “decouple from the 
primary perception of the world and run a so-called mental simulation of 
an alternative world” (Stanovich 2014). This action leaves us open to 
incursion from the un-simulated world. Simply put: “Animals that took 
attention away from primary perception tended to get eaten” (Ibid 2014). 
This, Stanovich suggests, is why it is so difficult to exercise foresight, and 
why, for instance, building and exploring mental simulations causes us to 
close our eyes, or look up at the ceiling in order to ease the effort (Ibid 
2014). Our minds recognize that foresight is a risky and costly operation, 
so they do their best to create a sense of aversion to engaging in protracted 
and deep speculation.10  
 Thomas Suddendorf also points out that our minds have a series of 
mechanisms for getting us out of the mode of mental simulation as 
quickly as possible. The sufficing criterion is one such mechanism. 
“People tend to go with the first solution they hit upon that suffices for 
dealing with their problem, rather than continue on a more exhaustive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 There is a strange push and pull in our ability to think about the future. On the 
one hand, our minds want us to engage in future thinking, and so we sometimes 
find it easy and pleasurable. As I mentioned earlier, we tend to engage in 
foresight whenever we have free thinking cycles; we call this daydreaming. And 
people also find that planning for the future greases the wheels of other mental 
faculties, such as our memory. That being said, our minds clearly do not want us 
to decouple so completely from the environment that we forget it entirely for 
lengths of time, lest we be gobbled up.  
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search to find an even better solution,” says Suddendorf. That we would 
naturally put a stop to mental simulation based on the sufficing criteria 
stops us from endlessly entertaining possible scenarios. “When you can 
conceive of various scenarios,” he says, “you have to have a way to stop 
yourself from doing that. As soon as something is sufficient, it makes 
sense to pull the plug and think about the next problem” (Suddendorf 
2014). 
 The sheer riskiness of engaging in foresight should give us pause; 
given the immediate danger to which it exposes us, foresight must have 
been an incredibly important feature of the human mind in the 
evolutionary environment in order to persist in the human mind. How do 
humans alone, as it appears, possess this astonishing skill?11  
 In order to answer this question, we have to set aside our 
assumptions about human exceptionalism. Humans, like all other 
creatures, have an evolutionary story, and so the answer must be sought 
in the prosaic and incremental story of our descent. Mathias Osvath and 
Peter Gädenfors suggest “the cultural niche that was created by the use of 
Oldowan tools, including the transport of tools and carcasses, lead to a 
selection for anticipatory cognition, and in particular anticipatory 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Suddendorf and Corballis raise the chilling and very plausible scenario in 
which our ancestors, after establishing a level of dominance over the 
environment, began to compete primarily with one another in inter-band arms 
races. The principally hostile forces in nature our ancestors faced in this retelling 
of our cognitive evolution were other humans. This might help explain the human 
tendency to violently clash with and displace other humans. In short, the 
characteristic most central to our human identity – the ability to inhabit the 
future – may have been won at the cost of perpetual inter-species warfare.   
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planning” (Osvath and Gädenfors 2005, 4; Plummer 2004, 135).  
	  Figure 3 The Oldowan niche had its own selective pressures. Adaptations to these 
pressures increased the fitness within the niche, and the environment in the niche 
changed as a result of the adaptations. This diagram shows the closed causal loop 
between the selective pressures of the Oldowan niche that drove our evolution, and 
ensuing elaboration of that very niche with our newly equipped bodies and brains.  
(Osvath and Gädenfors 2005, 7). 	  
 The Oldowan culture represents a watershed moment in the history 
of evolution. The niche first appeared as a result of several key changes in 
the environment of early humans: deforestation and expanded savannahs 
in Africa drastically reduced access to floral food while increasing access 
to large grazing herbivores. These environmental changes “resulted in 
selective pressures on the hominids that lead them to change their diet 
from predominately vegetarian to more protein and fat based” (Osvath 
and Gädenfors 2005, 6). Adapting to such a radically different niche 
must’ve required a genetic advantage conferring mental flexibility, even in 
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this very early stage of the evolution of anticipatory cognition. As 
philosopher Robert Arp points out, a reliance on mental associations or 
trial and error wouldn’t have sufficed, since “the environments in which 
these hominins found themselves were wholly new, and there would have 
been no precedent by or through which one could form mental 
associations utilizing past information” (Arp 2008, 146). It should come as 
no surprise that the fossil record dating to this period suggests that 
thousands of mammalian species went extinct, having failed to make the 
transition from an arboreal to a savannah-based lifestyle (Novacek 2002). 
Tracking, killing, and transporting animals requires a vastly different skill 
set than foraging for edible plants in dense forests. It is difficult to imagine 
how any creature – using only those physical skills acquired in forest life – 
could make the jump over to savannah life without finding a way to 
creatively modify their existing capacities in order to survive. Arp 
suggests the ability that saw our ancestors through this tumultuous period 
was a capacity for non-routine, creative problem solving, driven by the 
ability to visualize scenarios through “intermixing of visual information 
from mental modules” and “the active selection and integration of that 
information” for solving problems (Arp 2008, 146). It’s no surprise then 
that it’s in the Oldowan niche evidence of the manufacture and use of 
stone tools, the transportation of artefacts and stone tools, the transport of 
carcasses, and the use of accumulation spots (i.e. tool caches) appears in 
the pre-historical record for the first time. The abilities to combine visual 
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data from the past and present and imagine future outcomes, even if only 
in relation to very brief windows of time, must have been considerable 
advantages in adapting to a new niche.  
 The new niche changed our ancestors in fundamental ways. As 
Osvath and Gädenfors suggest, the effects of the Oldowan niche on 
human morphology was likely considerable. In an era when transport and 
mobility bestowed a considerable edge in survivability and reproduction, 
we became taller, and shorter and broader through the middle; 
adaptations suggestive of both long range travel and load bearing. The 
increase in brain volume and shrinking of our lower jaw suggest a high 
quality, easily digestible diet comprised of animal meat and foraged plant 
food (Ibid 8).   
 More importantly for our story, it also had a profound effect on our 
cognitive toolkit. The Oldowan culture was marked by an extension of the 
considerations of both time and space in relation to human behaviour. 
Evolutionary pressures toward developing expanded views of both time 
and space might’ve included “long delays between the acquisition and the 
use of the tool, as well as considerable geographical distances between the 
sources of tool raw material and killing sites” (Ibid 8). Because early 
humans could only carry so much, these realities made it necessary to 
economize and curate both tools on-hand and caches of tools in strategic 
(that is, mentally anticipated) locations (Plummer 2004, 133). Optimizing 
strategic carrying and caching meant keeping track mentally of the 
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resource available in a given accumulation spot so that hominids weren’t 
either trying to access depleted caches or restock caches that were already 
stocked (Osvath and Gädenfors 2005, 9). It also meant suppressing current 
goal states, such as indulging in lone calorie rich meals, in favor of 
projected goal states, such as bringing a kill home to one’s family – an 
action that has clear ramifications for reproductive success (Ibid, 10). 
 Osvath and Gädenfors also speculate that the need to collaborate 
on distal goal states – both temporally and spatially speaking – may have 
driven the development of symbolic communication. Language, as they 
point out, is based on representations as stand-ins for entities, real or 
imagined, that can override the need to indicate cues in the immediate 
environment for communication purposes (Ibid, 10). Animals that aren’t 
able to represent detached goal states can of course collaborate, as prides 
of lions do when strategically cutting off the escape of prey animals. But if 
the goal is remote in time and space “then a common representation of it 
must be produced before co-operative action can be taken” (Ibid, 10). As 
far we can tell, only humans can achieve this feat.  
 Like all behaviors that have a considerable net positive impact on 
reproductive success, conversing about the future as a group can feel 
good.12 In conversation, science fiction author and foresight practitioner 
Madeline Ashby has pointed out individuals in a foresight exercise “come 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Of course, there are also potential pathologies of future thinking. Some 
theorists suggest that obsessive-compulsive disorder and chronic stress are 
positively correlated to excessive future thinking (Zimbardo 1999, 1285) 
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alive” when prompted to think strategically about the future (personal 
communication, October 16). This natural exuberance for group future 
thinking might be as evolved a response as the tendency for modern 
humans working with stone samples – for example geologists – to 
unconsciously pick up and heft stone samples of optimal throwing size 
(Ibid, 5; Bingham et al, 507). But not everything that feels good is, of course, 
good for you. Just as the optimal function of our evolved feeding 
mechanisms have been disrupted by the abundance and ease of access of 
calories in our modern environments, so too can our evolved capacity for 
visualizing future scenarios fall short when faced with modern 
uncertainties.  
 On an individual level, our procedural foresight might be 
overactive. We may rely too much on semantic foresight, leading us to 
envision thin futures. And even though it is the most sophisticated of our 
evolved foresight capacities, the machinations of episodic foresight can 
distort our view of the future, leading us to make poor predictions and 
poor decisions.  
 Take the relatively simple example of predicting hedonic 
experiences. Episodic foresight allows us to form an emotional impression 
of how we might feel in some future scenario. For instance, if I am trying 
to decided whether to go to Disneyland tomorrow, I can imagine myself 
being there and “consult” the ensuing feeling: am I having a good time in 
this future scenario, or not? Of course, the “prefeeling” I am experiencing 
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in this visualization is not the actual feeling I will have when I am at 
Disneyland. It might be similar enough in order to help guide my decision 
making, or it might be somewhat, or even wildly, inaccurate. And as it 
turns out, there are many ways in which this strategy of prefeeling can lead 
us astray. As psychologists Dan Gilbert points out, the hedonic feeling I’m 
experiencing in the scenario (H1) will only reflect my actual feelings (H2) in 
the future if two conditions are met: first, that the contextual factors 
surrounding the time of scenario visualization (ē1)  – such as the weather, 
my level of stress, my mood, etc. – match with the contextual factors of the 
actual event (ē2); second, that my simulation of the event (e1) matches with 
my perception of the event itself (e2).  
Figure 4 Gilbert's diagram showing how hedonic experience is influenced by both mental 
representations (simulations and perceptions) and contextual factors. The elements that 
go into our prefeeling of an event – namely the current contextual factors of our 
imagining and our simulated preview of that event – will only match the way we actually 
feel once the event arrives if both the contextual factors and our perception of the event 
are reasonably similar to the conditions in which we imagined it. Otherwise, our 
prefeeling of the event will not be a good analog for how we actually feel – a state of 
affairs that will adhere more often than not. (Gilbert et al. 2007, 1352). 
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 Errors in prospection, says Gilbert, “arise from the fact that people 
use their prefeelings to make hedonic predictions even when one or both 
of these conditions is not met” (Ibid, 1352). Gilbert isolates four different 
ways that we fail to meet these conditions. 
 First, we tend to use unrepresentative material from our past 
experiences when building scenarios of the future. The past material that 
is most “ready-to-hand” for building scenarios of the future are generally 
those memories that have some kind of salience; they stand out from the 
crowd of memories, and when we select them we are submitting to the 
availability heuristic (“This memory is the first that came to mind, so it’s 
the one I’ll use.”). As Gilbert observes: “It seems that everyone remembers 
their best day, their worst day, and their yesterday. Because unusual 
events and recent events are so memorable, people tend to use them when 
construction simulations of future events” (Ibid, 1353). 
 Second, since it takes a great amount of cognitive effort to imagine 
scenarios in detail, we tend instead to create essentialized scenarios based 
on what we believe to be it’s key features. Omitting all these details – 
which can influence hedonic experience as much as essential features – 
causes us to “predict that good events will be better and bad events will be 
worse than they actually turn out to be” (Gilbert et al. 2007, 1353). The 
effect of essentializing might also be amplified by temporal delays due to 
our tendency to think of far futures more abstractly than near futures: 
assessing the hedonic experience of taking a vacation next week might 
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include the prefeeling of airport security, while imagining a vacation five 
years from now might not (Liberman et al. 2002, 532). Hyper-essentialism 
regarding distant future scenarios might explain why people tend to 
orient to either highly optimistic or highly pessimistic beliefs about the far 
future. More prosaically, it also neatly explains why “people so often 
make future commitments that they regret when the time to fulfill them 
arrives” (Gilbert 2007, 1353).   
 Third, our simulation of future events is naturally abbreviated; if 
they weren’t, it would take as long to simulate the event as it does to 
actually experience it. In addition, the moments that people select when 
simulating the future tend to be crowded toward the beginning of 
scenarios. For instance, when asked to imagine losing mobility, able-
bodied people predict that they will be much more unhappy than 
individuals who’ve lost mobility actually report feeling. This seems to be 
because the able-bodied individuals considering scenarios of mobility loss 
construct their hedonic response based on “the initial – and typically the 
worst – moments of these events” (Ibid. 2007, 1353). This causes us to 
construct very pessimistic outlooks for these scenarios. As psychologist 
Maggie Toplak points out: “People just can’t imagine that if they were met 
with some tragic and unhappy event in the future that they would ever be 
able to cope” (personal communication, March 6).  
 The inability to predict adaptive responses to situations is among 
the most commonly observed errors in research on hedonic predictions. It 
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seems our brains are not good at writing endings, but they love a good 
opening. In other words, when considering the affective components of a 
future scenario, we are much more likely to focus on events that come 
early in the narrative, and far less likely to envision the mid-point or 
ending. We easily imagine ourselves, full of energy, bounding through the 
gates of Disneyland, but are not as likely to imaginatively place ourselves 
in second hour of our wait in line for Splash Mountain. 
 Finally, our scenarios of the future tend to be decontextualized, 
floating free of the broader factors that color our perception of present 
events. Because scenarios of the future are unrepresentative, essentialized, 
and abbreviated, they also tend to lack the stable “background” against 
which we can assess our hedonic response. This leads people to 
overweigh current contextual factors when considering hedonic responses 
to the future. For instance, low blood sugar in the present might cause us 
to feel blasé about the prospects of going to Disneyland tomorrow, after 
we will have eaten a hearty lunch. Alternately, it can also cause us to 
underweigh the impact of contextual factors that will surround future 
events. People overestimate how unhappy they will be if their favorite 
team loses a football game, because they do not consider that their 
hedonic experience at the time will be influenced by more than what is 
simply on the scoreboard (Wilson et al. 2000, 825). 
 Our poor showing when it comes to accurate affective forecasting, 
as Maggie Toplak points out, is a particular manifestation of a much 
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broader set of issues in human cognition: thinking is hard and unpleasant 
work, so humans use any excuse to behave like “cognitive misers” in 
order to get out of it. Instead, they’ll engage their availability bias, and 
take the high fluency they experience in coming up with answers as an 
indication of their veracity (personal communication, March 6). A further 
complication is that indulging our heuristic thinking often feels good: 
cognitive scientist Valerie Thompson calls this affect “the feeling of being 
right”, which is strongest when we quickly and fluently read problems 
and generate responses (Thompson et al 2012, 237).  
 Serious, deliberative thinking does not have these virtues. The 
problem is compounded when we are being asked in addition to think 
about unpleasant events; in this case, we are apt to experience negative 
affect issuing both from the process of thinking and the object of thought 
itself. “Thinking about happy things that are going to happen in your 
future is affectively pleasant and may not be very taxing on you,” says 
Toplak, “and that's a different activity than the hypothetical, cognitive 
decoupling activities that are actually very hard and create negative 
affect” (personal communication, March 6). 
 These tendencies to misfuture might have minimal impacts in 
cultural and technological environments where not much changes over an 
individual’s lifetime. This appears to have been the case during the period 
in which the cognitive ability for episodic future thinking primarily 
developed. In the everyday Paleolithic, today’s hunt probably looked 
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quite a lot like the hunt of yesterday, and highly salient events – such as 
failed raids and near tramplings – were instructive raw materials for 
planning and constructing future scenarios. But in cultures where the pace 
of change in a single individual’s lifetime completely remodels the 
technologies they can access and the social milieu in which they find 
themselves every few years (or even more often), the capacity for episodic 
future thinking we inherited from our Paleolithic ancestors will be far less 
reliable. The native futuring abilities of our minds were not “designed” to 
account for the rate of change and sudden discontinuities to which we are 
exposed in the modern world. To illustrate, consider that it took over 1 
million years for hominids to move from blunt, clumsy Oldowan 
technologies to slightly more refined Acheulean stone tools. Over this 
same time period, the distances observed between the location of raw 
materials for stone tools and their geological sources increased from 10 km 
to approximately 20 km, doubling the range of typical hominid bands. In 
contrast, a “mere 12,000 years separate the first bow and arrow from the 
International Space Station” (Ambrose 2001, 1752), and the ability for a 
single human to range over the whole planet, and beyond.   
 
 
 3.5 Time Perspectives 
 
 The common shortcomings and dysfunctions of prospection, 
however, are only part of the story. It seems there are also crucial 
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individual differences in the way each of us perceives time that can lead 
us to exhibit individual quirks in the way we think – or fail to think – 
about the future.  
 As it turns out, life staging turns out to be an important factor in 
the way we think about both the past and the future. Psychologist Donna 
Addis and her co-researchers tested college age students (average age: 25) 
and older adults (average age: 72) on their ability to generate both 
semantic and episodic memories of the past and prospection for the 
future. When cued with a word and asked to use it both to remember the 
past and project into the future, they found that young adults were more 
likely to employ episodic memory and episodic future thinking in their 
responses. Older adults, on the other hand, showed a reduction in the 
episodic specificity of past events that extended to the way they imagined 
future events. They were more likely to both recall the past and imagine 





Table 1.	  A comparison of semantic and episodic recall and prospection in both college 
age and older adults. In these examples, individuals are prompted with a cue word and 
a request to describe some element of either their future or past relating to that word. 
From these samples, we can see that young participants generated substantial episodic 
information in both past and future events, while older participants tended to provide 
non-episodic, semantic descriptions related to cuing words. From Addis et al. 2007, 
reported in Schacter et al. 2007.	  
 If our life stage affects our use of either semantic or episodic 
elements in constructing future scenarios, it also impacts the way in which 
we evaluate how we might act in those futures.  
 Psychologist Laura Carstensen’s research further suggests that 
individuals are influenced in their decision making by their perception of 
time as either open ended and expansive, or closed and limited. 
Carstensen’s socioemotional selectivity theory predicts “perception of 
gains and losses is influenced importantly by individuals’ temporal 
frameworks” (Carstensen 1999, 177). The perception of time as either 
expansive or limited is, of course, tightly correlated with life staging: 
young people are more likely to perceive time as only abstractly bounded, 
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while older people are more likely to grasp the finitude of life. As we 
might expect, this leads to differences in decision-making. Individuals 
who perceive the future as open ended and expansive are more likely to 
pursue avenues that maximize their future possibilities, regardless of 
whether they have an impact on present circumstances. Those who 
perceive time to be limited will tend to more heavily weigh present gains 
over future possibilities, and therefore may choose, for instance, to invest 
more time and energy in cultivating existing relationships rather than 
seeking out new social connections. We shouldn’t be fatalistic about these 
frames, but changing them does require willful thought: “age related 
patterns do emerge, but even these age patterns can be altered when 
individuals adopt a time perspective different from what is predicted by 
their place in the life cycle” (Carstensen 1999, 166). 
 Finally, there are also individual temperamental dimensions to time 
perception, apart from life staging, that bear consideration. Psychologist 
Philip Zimbardo – most famous for his controversial Stanford Prison 
Experiment – developed an inventory for assessing individual differences 
in the perception of time. The aim of the Zimbardo Time Perception 
Inventory (ZPTI) is to measure “the often nonconscious process whereby 
continual flows of personal and social experiences are assigned to 
temporal categories, or time frames, that help to give order, coherence, 
and meaning to those events” (Zimbardo & Boyd 1999, 1271).  These 
frames, in turn, are used “in encoding storing, and recalling experienced 
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events, as well as in forming expectations, goals, contingencies, and 
imaginative scenarios” (Ibid, 1271-1272). The Inventory isolates three 
dominant “frames” through which individuals tend to view experiences 
and construct responses to them. Individuals employing a “past frame” 
will tend to recall analogous prior situations when forming judgments, 
paying special attention to the costs and benefits connected with decisions 
made at the time. Those with a “future frame” focus instead on 
“anticipations and expectations constructed to embody an extension of the 
present into the future when the calculated costs of this current action will 
be paid or reward will be reaped” (Ibid, 1272). Individuals employing 
future frames are more likely to draw on considerations of alternative 
goal-states, means-ends relationships, and probabilistic assessments – in 
other words, to consider possible and probable future scenarios. Finally, 
individuals relying on a “present frame” will tend to focus instead on 
their current mindset and affects, de-emphasizing the influence of both 
past and prospective events. Where past and future oriented individuals 
will be adept at delaying gratification and disconnecting themselves from 
current goal states, present-focused individuals may be more highly 
influenced by “sensory, biological, and social qualities associated with the 
salient elements of the present environment” (Ibid, 1272). 
 People, of course, can flexibly deploy different temporal frames for 
different situations. This can be a prudent strategy: you might gleefully 
adapt a present frame that drives you to indulge when confronted with a 
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Klondike Bar while on family vacation, but employ a past frame – 
hearkening back to that time you ate a Klondike Bar and laid prone on the 
couch groaning for an hour afterward – or a future frame – thinking about 
your goal to run a full marathon in three month’s time – when in the same 
situation at the corner store down the street from your house. However, in 
certain cases, the use of specific frames can become chronic, leading to “a 
dispositional style, or individual-difference variable, that is characteristic 
and predictive of how an individual will respond across a host of daily life 
choices” (Ibid, 1272).  
 Zimbardo’s inventory also suggests several different valences to 
time perception: past-negative frames are associated with depression, 
anxiety, unhappiness, and low self esteem, whereas past-positive frames 
are characterized by “glowing, nostalgic, positive construction of the past” 
but tended to not be positive correlated with future present frame traits 
like novelty seeking, sensation seeking, or preference for consistency” 
(Ibid, 1278); present-hedonistic frames orient us toward enjoyment, 
pleasure, and excitement, with a lower emphasis on future considerations 
and a low preference for consistency, while present-fatalistic frames cause 
us to be both muted in our future outlook and passive in the present, 
subject to the whims of a perceived predetermination. 
 In this chapter, we’ve reviewed many of the common features of 
future thinking shared by most people with typical cognitive function. The 
Janus Hypothesis suggests that our ability for prospection has deep 
	  66	  
functional and physiological ties with our memory; the better we 
understand this connection, the more surprising commonalities we will no 
doubt discover between past and future oriented cognition. Using the 
Janus Hypothesis as a basis for understanding, we unpacked the 
theoretical layers of future cognition, examining procedural, semantic, and 
episodic prospection in turn and suggesting ways in which each of these 
abilities are subject to biases and heuristics which can cause us to 
misfuture in various ways. We then examined some of the factors 
underlying individual differences in time perception, and goal and 
motivation structures related to temporality.  
 Our takeaways should be that treating “future thinking” as a single, 
monolithic skill is far too simplistic, and assuming that humans qua 
humans share a generic conception of the future ignores important 
distinctions that may impact the way strategic foresight is conducted. As it 
stands, strategic foresight is a blunt tool for addressing these intricacies; in 
important ways, the methodology reflects pre-critical assumptions about 
future thinking which might make it ineffective in addressing certain 
biases of future think, or worse, exacerbating the very biases it purports to 
address. In the next chapter, we’ll examine some of these shortcoming in 
the methodology, and explore how developing targeted methods and 
protocols in order to mitigate the effect of systemic biases in future 
thinking is essential in order for strategic foresight to have a reasonable 
claim to helping us “create and sustain a variety of high-quality forward 
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views and to apply the emerging insights in useful ways” (Hines and 
Bishop 2006, v)
	  68	  
4. THE VIRTUES AND ERRORS OF 
STRATEGIC FORESIGHT 	  
 Many of the methods that make up strategic foresight to this day 
predate widespread dissemination and understanding of the key findings 
of the research we surveyed in the last chapter. While Herman Kahn was 
pioneering the institutional use of scenario planning at the RAND 
Corporation, Amos Tversky and Daniel Kahneman were still more than a 
decade and a half away from embarking on their era-making studies of 
human decision making (Kahneman 2011, 8; Millet 2009, 62). The 
University of Toronto conference at which Endel Tulving would first 
propose semantic memory as a distinct system from both acquired skill 
and autobiographical memory, setting in motion research into the 
tripartite division of human (and animal) memory and foresight, was 
likewise as far in the future. Philip Zimbardo’s research on time 
perception was even more remote; in the early seventies, he was 
immersed in research on the psychology of prison life that would lead to 
the infamous Stanford Prison Experiment, for which he is still best known. 
These research projects, in conjunction with countless other new 
theoretical models and pieces of experimental evidence, contributed to the 
growing “cognitive revolution” in psychology that nowadays shapes 
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everything from the study of group thinking and radicalization to the 
creation of public policy and store layouts.13 
 Since the cognitive revolution was, at its core, a counter-revolution, 
we should quickly take stock of the paradigm against which it was a 
reaction. The intellectual climate in which scenario planning – which 
remains at the core of strategic foresight – was developed was an era of 
scientific management and behaviour-based approaches to the study of 
human psychology. With the benefit of hindsight, we can now see how the 
technological and scientific developments made in the early decades of the 
20th century formed a powerful juncture in which humans could attempt 
the scientific management of human affairs. Strategy and planning efforts 
of the early 20th century were influenced by an intellectual milieu that 
included huge breakthroughs in physics and engineering sciences as well 
as the rise of reductionist psychological research programs such as 
psychoanalysis and behaviorism. Driven by the success of their brethren 
in the physical sciences, psychologists especially were seeking a new 
paradigm that could transform their discipline into a bona fide, 
quantitative science. In his personal reflections on the behavioral 
revolution, psychologist George A. Miller (an early entrant in the 
cognitive revolution) writes that a group of experimental psychologists, 
“influenced by Pavlov and other physiologists, proposed to redefine 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 I include as an extension of the “cognitive revolution” the erstwhile “affective 
revolution” which is returning the study of emotion and arousal to psychology in 
an experimentally rigorous way. See, for instance, the work of Dan Ariely 
referenced in Chapter 3.  
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psychology as the science of behaviour”, arguing that “mental events are 
not publically observable” and so “the only objective evidence available is, 
and must be, behavioral” (Miller 2003, 141).14 
 As antecedents, these developments made a strong prima facie case 
that the application of the right formal methodology could render the 
world knowable - or, in the case of foresight, could make known those 
things that were unknown - and that human behaviour and decision-
making could be effectively organized and operationalized through these 
methodologies analogously to the way in which the flow of electrons was 
managed in a circuit. The core foresight methodology, with scenario 
planning at its heart, remains a product of the intellectual era in which 
scientific management reigned; for reasons that are hard to understand – 
perhaps due to its relative simplicity when stacked against other tools for 
organizational change, perhaps because of the convenient time lag 
between foresight exercises and the time horizons they investigate - it has 
been surprisingly resistant to change.  
 It’s also important to understand that the aims of scenario planning 
in its initial inception were not to root out and dampen the pernicious 
effects of biases and heuristics in the way we think about the future, but 
rather to think the unthinkable, to paraphrase the title of Kahn’s most well 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 The fact that Gaston Berger was concurrently developing a similar set of tools 
in France he called “La Prospective” is a wrinkle in this story, since by all 
accounts European experimental psychologists were not held in sway by 
behaviorism – but like the Americans, they were neither privy to any clear, 
experimental findings on the pervasive and persistent nature of cognitive biases.  
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known book. The aim of thinking the unthinkable is still very much in line 
conceptually with the most commonly and plainly stated objective of 
strategic foresight: to reduce all the uncertainty that you can, but not more than 
that.15 Intuitively, it’s easy to make the case that imaginatively exploring 
the most critical uncertainties in a space in order to form images of the 
possible can help us to manage uncertainty. But without proper checks 
and balances in place against the excesses and shortcomings of human 
foresight in the strategic methodology, there’s really no telling in the end 
if we’ve indeed managed it, or made it worse. Human minds, it turns out, 
are more unruly things than electrons.  
 No doubt, it’s a testament to Kahn’s genius that many facets of his 
methodology for building mental models of the future seemed to 
naturally address the excesses of both overly rigid methodologies and the 
fixation-prone human mind. That Kahn incorporated elements of 
Hollywood screenwriting into his exploration and strategic planning of 
the consequences of nuclear war – a topic many people thought warranted 
only sober-minded discussion – demonstrates his impulse to break from 
the protocols of the scientific management paradigm. At the same time, 
Kahn railed against the sentiment that the prospect of nuclear war was too 
horrible to be discussed using normal, neutral, professional, everyday 
language. Kahn sought a solution somewhere between the poles of 
creativity and analysis: “Awe is fine for those who come to worship or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 Thanks to Peter Bishop for suggesting this useful formulation as an 
improvement over the simple and misleading injunction “to reduce uncertainty”.  
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admire,” he wrote, “but for those who come to analyze, to tamper, to 
change, to criticize, a factual and dispassionate, and sometimes even 
colorful, approach is to be preferred” (Kahn 1962).  
 At the same time, Kahn was also sensitive to the ways in which 
over-reliance on available information or the rigid use of thinking tools 
could create barriers for thinking deliberately and rationally about a 
subject. For instance, Kahn’s insistence that probabilities not be attached to 
scenarios can be read as an attempt to stop participants from becoming 
overly mentally invested in certain visions of the future (Kahn 1962, 150). 
This safeguard that suggests an intuitive understanding of the tendency 
for people to become anchored in even meaningless numbers and use them 
as an uncritical benchmark with which to measure difference and 
deviation, a phenomenon that Kahneman and Tversky would be go on to 
thoroughly experimentally explore  (Kahneman 2011, 119).16 “If there’s one 
message we can take from [Kahn’s book On Thermonuclear War],” 
strategic management researcher Mark P. Healey told me, “it’s that people 
are sensitive to possibilities, not probabilities” (personal communication, 
November 20 2013).  
 Kahn also recognized the danger of becoming fixated on a subset of 
environmental information to the point of missing larger, looming threats. 
In her book The Worlds of Herman Kahn: The Intuitive Science of 
Thermonuclear War, Cold War scholar Sharon Ghamari-Tabrizi relates an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
16 However, as we’ll see, avoiding discussion and use of probabilities entirely can 
lead to its own brand of myopia. 
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anecdote of Kahn in his natural environment, delivering a slideshow 
lecture on the pitfalls of uncertainty and unknowability to a group of air 
force officials sometime in the 1950s:  
The next cartoon shows a man steering a roadster off a crook in a 
mountain road, distracted by a buxom woman gazing at the view. 
[Kahn] jabs a finger at the drawing and tries to suppress a giggle. 
“Another mistake which is very very important is over-
concentration. This is the kind of thing that, for example, you see: 
he’s just concentrating not on the wrong thing – it’s worth looking 
at, but not exclusively. We don’t object to you looking at the blonde. 
We’d look at her ourselves [but] you should look at something else. 
There’s a cliff over here. And the point is look around, look for 
loopholes, see what’s happening. (Ghamari-Tabrizi 2005, 13) 
 
 Kahn’s use of language in this example is perhaps telling, since he 
references the behavior of looking when discussing what is really myopia 
caused by excessive mental attention and fixation on certain information. 
Despite Kahn’s ranging intellect and willingness to incorporate diverse 
bodies of knowledge, the foresight methods we’ve inherited from his 
work, and the work of others at the time attempting to develop intuitive 
ways to reduce uncertainty, remain situated in a place in intellectual 
history marked by the tail end of scientific management paradigms and 
the behavioral revolution; the most we can say is that some of the methods 
are suggestive of the ur-science of human judgment and decision-making 
that would only come to fruition years (and in some cases, decades) later.  
 Historically, these shortcomings have largely escaped the notice of 
commentators and practitioners of strategic foresight. In his book on 
organizational excellence, Competitive Advantage, Michael Porter calls 
strategic foresight “a powerful device for taking account of uncertainty in 
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making strategic choices” (Porter 1985, 447). Kees van der Heijden has 
stressed the value of scenario planning as a means of creating cultures of 
learning and building organizational foresight practices, even praising the 
intuitively causal elements of scenarios for these purposes (van der 
Heijden 2005, 139). Though van der Heijden himself refers to scenarios as 
a “cognitive device”, a critical engagement with the psychological 
literature on human biases and heuristics is almost entirely missing from 
the foresight oeuvre. The overall impression of strategic foresight as a 
“panacea for strategic decision making under uncertainty” ignores that 
“using scenarios to inform organizational decisions is a complex matter 
and can yield mixed psychological effects, some of which might actually 
impair judgment and decision making” (Healy and Hodgkinson 2007, 
556). As we will see, it’s not only scenarios that bear more scrutiny; every 
step of the strategic foresight methodology is rife with opportunities for 
cementing foresight biases. What follows is a preliminary examination of 
some of the ways that strategic foresight can run afoul of the way humans 
spontaneously and naturally think about the future.  
 
 4.1 Delphi Polling, Desirability Bias, and 
 Group Polarization  
 
 Originally developed by the RAND Corporation in the 1950’s to 
help forecast the effects of technology on the future of warfare, The Delphi 
Method of expert polling has ever since been used as a means of building 
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consensus views about the future among experts on everything from 
foreign policy to the future of food. The method’s rationale is simple: 
anonymous polling and reflection avoids the influence exerted by biasing 
factors in open discussions, such as deference to authority or dominant 
personalities, on the one hand, and the tendency for groups to get mired 
in their differences and fail to reach consensus on shared views, on the 
other. If we can discover those assertions about the future shared among a 
broad range of experts, so the thinking goes, then we will have articulated 
a “core vision” of highly plausible expert judgments that we can then use 
to inform the rest of our explorations: “… through the exchange of expert 
knowledge, iteration in the survey process, provision of controlled 
feedback, and convergence of probability assessments, the adverse effects 
of cognitive limitations on probability assessments such as 
overconfidence, can be reduced” (Ecken et al 2010, 1654). 
 However, this simple picture of building a plausible picture of the 
future based on the consensus of experts overlooks several important 
confounding factors. First, what assurance do we have that the consensus 
view is actually based on anything like the most plausible of the 
aggregated expert opinions? The assumption seems to be that opinions 
shared among multiple experts must be in some way uncontroversial, but 
a recent study of Delphi raises serious questions about whether this is the 
case.   
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 Researcher Phillip Ecken and his colleagues examined the data 
from six Delphi exercises in order to determine the effects of desirability 
bias on expert judgment. Desirability bias, a simple and pervasive quirk of 
human reasoning, is the tendency to overestimate the probability of 
favorable outcomes and underestimate the probability of unfavorable 
ones.17 In the six Delphi exercises, the researchers asked “a total of 200 
qualified experts from business, academia, and government or public 
authorities” to assess the probability of a given development on a 
percentage scale from 0% to 100%, and also rate its desirability on a five-
point scale. In total, the researchers gathered data on 8300 paired 
desirability-probability assessments throughout the testing.  
 What they found was a considerable positive correlation between 
how favorable a development was and the perceived probability of its 
taking place some time in the future. What this means is that, absent the 
right controls, we should expect that the consensus view of experts in a 
Delphi exercise should be highly influenced by the desirability of the 
agreed-upon predictions, and this effect will be amplified in groups that 
are more homogenous (i.e. groups in which all the experts represent 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
17 A quick and easy way to see desirability bias in effect is to ask a friend the 
probability of their sports team making it to playoffs, and then contrast this 
judgment with the judgment of professional odds-makers; chances are very good 
that your friend’s probability assessment will be significantly higher than that of 
individuals who stand to make money on the accuracy of their assessment. One 
easy way to make money is to ask your friends to lay down bets based on their 
inflated assessments. This is not, however, a good way to make friends.  
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similar viewpoints in the same industry). Ecken’s group provides an 
illustrative example:  
Consider the following Delphi projection: “In 2030, Chinese car 
manufactures dominate the automobile industry”. Experts X, Y, 
and Z all estimate the probability of this projection. Expert X is 
personally involved in the Chinese car industry and is likely to find 
this projection desirable and thus assesses the probability higher 
than expert Y, whose desirability about this projection is neutral. 
Vice versa, expert Z who is personally involved in the US car 
industry might find this projection undesirable and gives a lower 
probability of occurrence to that event than Y. The point is that 
even though X and Z are led by desirability bias, Delphi reports the 
average of X, Y, and Z and thus the subjective bias of desirability 
bias that influenced X and Z could be offset. Thus, in this case 
Delphi's averaging characteristic eliminates, or at least reduces, the 
desirability bias. However, if we change our example slightly, the 
following occurs: X, Y and Z are all personally involved in the 
Chinese car industry. They all share a high desirability for the 
projection and would all overestimate the probability. In this case, 
Delphi's averaging would not reduce or eliminate the bias and 
desirability bias becomes a “dysfunctional shared representation” 
(Ibid, 1664). 
 The researchers also point out that, interestingly, the effects of 
desirability bias in Delphi polling seem to be stronger the longer the 
timeframe is under consideration; it seems counterintuitive, but in the face 
of increased uncertainty and lacking strong evidence to justify their 
predictions, polled experts will rely more heavily on their desirability bias, 
leading to ever more heavily biased projections and probability 
assessments based on affective sorting.  
 For these reason, we should not assume that use of the Delphi 
Method always produces consensus around relatively uncontroversial 
predictions. Especially in homogenous Delphi groups (i.e. in which all 
experts are working in or around a given industry), the exercise may well 
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produce results that reflect the tendency for homogenous groups to build 
consensus based on increasingly polarized views. In his book Going to 
Extremes: How Like Minds Unite and Divide, US legal scholar Cass 
Sunstein describes the phenomenon of group polarizations as follows: 
“When people find themselves in groups of like-minded types, they are 
especially likely to move toward extremes” (Sunstein 2009, 2). It is easy to 
see how this phenomenon might take hold in open group discussions, but 
group polarization effects don’t require face-to-face interactions. This effect 
can even be translated through second-hand exposure to the opinions of 
others belonging to one’s group (as is often the case in Delphi exercises), 
and even across distinct sets of individuals. Sunstein provides the 
following synopsis of a study of group polarization in a church setting: 
About a hundred church members were given a survey of sixteen 
church-related opinion statements, such as “ministers should feel 
free to take a stand from the pulpit on a political issue.” Three 
weeks later, 169 other church members were given either the 
average of the hundred responses or a frequency distribution of the 
hundred responses, and then asked to make their own responses. 
They showed significantly more extreme attitudes than the original 
hundred (Ibid, 164). 
 
 Because Delphi exercises tend to be deployed in the early stages of 
insight gathering and so feed into later exercises in a foresight engagement 
– such as scenario planning, windtunnelling, and tangible futures – and 
because the opinions of experts may carry inordinate weight both for 
foresight practitioners and individuals engaged in a foresight activity, the 
effects of desirability bias in an uncontrolled Delphi exercise stand a high 
chance of surviving through the course of a foresight exercise, heavily 
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coloring both the mental models of participants and the outputs of the 
activity. Systemic desirability bias in the context of foresight can lead us to 
the conclusions that the futures we most want are the futures that we are 
most likely to get, a situation that might lead to short tem psychological 
benefits and happy clients without getting us any closer to a future-
proofed strategic vision.  
 Unless the aim of the foresight activity is to unearth the preferred 
future of an industry or organization, foresight practitioners should take 
care to build additional controls into Delphi exercises in order to protect 
against the effects of group polarization and desirability bias. In a chapter 
on preventing extremism in groups, Sunstein suggests that groups also 
discuss the consequences, both negative and positive, that might follow if 
their predictions were to come true (Ibid, 134).  
 Another strategy for reducing these effects would be to have Delphi 
participants declare the desirability of the states of affairs represented in 
their predictions alongside their confidence ratings, as suggested by Ecken 
and his co-researchers. Simply highlighting the common effects of the 
desirability bias on predictions prior to the Delphi exercise may itself 
make experts subject to its effects. In addition, foresight practitioners can 
also perform a post-hoc analysis in order to determine the correlation 
between the assigned probabilities and desirability of each prediction, 
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determine the effects of desirability bias, and adjust biased predictions for 
those effects, as described by Ecken and his co-researchers (Ibid, 1664).18  
 Finally, paying particular attention to ensuring diversity of opinion 
within the expert group may be the simplest means of reducing 
desirability bias and polarization effects. As Sunstein points out, curating 
diversity of opinion is common practice among groups where the stakes of 
being led astray by biases are high:  
Well-functioning groups attempt to ensure a diversity of views, if 
only to protect themselves against blunders and confusion. If teams 
of doctors want to make accurate diagnoses, they will promote a 
norm of skepticism, even among younger and less experienced 
members. If corporations want to avoid disaster, they do best to 
create diverse boards that do not defer to the CEO (Ibid, 147). 
  
 Just as group diversity reduced the aggregated effect of the 
desirability bias in the above anecdote on the future of Chinese car 
manufacturing, diversity of opinion can also dispel the tendency for group 
polarization effects to push groups to more extreme predictions.  	  
 4.2 Trend Extrapolation and Non-Regression  	  
	   One of the hallmarks of human reasoning is that we will behave 
like cognitive misers if given the slightest opportunity to do so. In order to 
preserve our precious cognitive resources, we’ll substitute a hard problem 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The method itself presumes familiarity with probability theory, but foresight 
practitioners shouldn’t be deterred; throughout this paper, I have suggested that 
the future of foresight as a proven methodology depends crucially on the ability 
of its practitioners to improve both the methodology itself and its results through 
learning, iteration, controlled experimentation, and quantitative methods.  
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for a comparatively easy one, doing our best to hide the bait-and-switch 
from everyone (including our own conscious mind) so that we aren’t 
forced to do the harder mental work thorough analysis would involve 
(Stanovich et al 2010, 19). In the domain of future thinking, one (among 
many) potential result of this tendency, as Daniel Kahneman points out, is 
that “intuitive judgments can be made with high confidence even when 
they are based on a nonregressive assessment of weak evidence” 
(Kahneman 2011, 185). In other words, we often feel good about our 
judgments about the future even when we have little evidence to go on 
and our judgment of future outcomes are exactly identical – that is, 
nonregressive – in comparison to the judgment we’d make if we were 
prompted to make an assessment about the present rather than the future. 
An experiment conducted by Kahneman and Tversky illustrates and 
explains the phenomenon (Ibid, 187). They asked participants to judge the 
descriptions of eight college freshmen, allegedly written by a counselor 
assessing them for enrolment in a class. Each description consisted of 
merely five adjectives, such as: 
 intelligent, self-confident, well-read, hardworking, inquisitive 
They then prompted one set of participants to answer the following two 
questions: 
 How much does this description impress you with respect to 
academic ability? 
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What percentage of descriptions of freshmen do you think would 
impress you more? 
Kahneman suggests that, in the absence of any further information, 
people tend to answer this question by comparing the descriptions of the 
students to their internal norm about how counselors describe students. 
As he points out, the very existence of such a norm is in itself remarkable; 
it’s quite likely that participants engaged in this experiment have never 
done any serious thinking on the subject, and may be creating a token of 
this norm in their minds completely out of whole cloth. Despite this, most 
participants had the sense that these adjectives, while positive, were not 
the most superlative adjectives they could use to describe students; they 
could have been brilliant, spectacular, erudite, shockingly original, etc. As 
a result, most participants gauged that students ascribed the five word 
description above were likely to be in the top 15%, but likely not in the top 
3%. As Kahneman reports, there was impressive consensus around this 
range of judgments (Ibid, 188).  
Kahneman and Tversky asked the second set of participants a 
slightly different set of questions:  
What is your estimate of the grade point average that the student 
will obtain? 
What is the percentage of freshmen that obtain a higher GPA? 
The difference in the two sets of statements, Kahneman points out, 
is that in the first, participants are simply asked to make their evaluation 
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based on the evidence in the descriptions. The second set of statements 
treads through a great deal more uncertainty, such as: “What happened 
during the year since the interview was performed? How accurately can 
you predict the student’s actual achievements in the first year of college 
from adjectives? Would the counselor herself be perfectly accurate if she 
predicted GPA from an interview” (Ibid, 188)? 
The experiment was designed to assess the percentile gap 
participants made when merely evaluating evidence, in the first set of 
questions, and making predictions about the future performance of 
students based on their descriptions, in the second. Kahneman and 
Tversky found that the judgments participants made in both cases were 
identical. Why might this be the case? Cognitive miserliness helps to 
explain the result: “People are asked for a prediction but they substitute 
an evaluation of the evidence, without noticing that the question they 
answer is not the one they were asked” (Ibid, 188).  Accounting for the 
above factors in rejigging our judgments is hard cognitive work, and so 
we fool ourselves into using our present evaluations as a “close enough” 
stand in.  
Of course, we might condemn this as poor futures thinking, simply 
on the grounds that it does not account for the stories we might be able to 
tell about the paths students might take through their education. But that 
is only half the failing of this type of heuristic thinking; the other half is 
something that is more likely to be overlooked by foresight practitioners, 
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since it often left out of an accounting of the causal stories about future 
change that are central to strategic foresight. Critically, using our present 
evaluation as a stand-in for predictions ignores the brute phenomenon of 
“regression to the mean”, a phenomenon so counterintuitive that it wasn’t 
understood till “two hundred years after the theory of gravitation and 
differential calculus” (Ibid, 179).  
Simply stated, regression to the mean is the probabilistic tendency 
for most measurements to cluster around an average over time, rather 
than toward the upper or lower limits of a range. One evocative way to 
understand regression to the mean is to consider physical attractiveness in 
offspring. With reference to regression, we should expect the offspring of 
attractive individuals to be, on average, less attractive than their parents, 
and offspring of unattractive individuals to be, on average, more 
attractive. There is no “causal” accounting for this; its simply because 
attractiveness and unattractiveness are polarized descriptions remote from 
an average, and that most people are average looking (which, of course, is 
what average means). To relate it back to Kahneman and Tversky’s 
experiment, subjects asked to provide a prediction fail to account for the 
fact that a student who is above average in their freshman year is more 
likely to under-perform based on the expectations of this assessment than 
they are to over-perform. Mercifully, the opposite is also true: students 
who are below average are likely to improve toward the mean rather than 
become worse.  
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Since our minds naturally seek causal explanations for events, we 
want to believe that the adjectives used to describe freshmen students 
point to personal attributes that will sure-footedly carry them through to 
the 85th percentile in their classes. Because regression to the mean has a 
statistical, rather than a causal, explanation, we do not naturally think to 
account for its effects when rendering our judgments about the future.  
Just as seeing the image of Jesus on a piece of toast is a result of our over-
active tendency to spot agents in the environment, we are fooled by the 
hardwiring of our brain into over-stating the case for the causal stories we 
concoct.19 
There are many, many opportunities in the strategic foresight 
methodology for our cognitive miserliness to take over, leading us to 
substitute easy present evaluations for hard projections. The most obvious 
stage at which this might happen is in the process of projecting emerging 
trends into our future scenarios. In order to understand why we’re 
vulnerable to substitution in this part of process, we should first note that 
present evaluations are “easy” only relative to the labor of thinking 
through the messiness of the future when extrapolating trends. Daniel 
Kahneman provides a partial catalog of the cognitive work we need to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 I’m not suggesting that we should rely more heavily on those images of the 
future that represent a world that is “like today, only more so.” The work of 
“going out” to extremes in scenario building remains valuable, since it can help 
acquaint us with the broader possibility space under consideration. Rather, we 
should take any “raw” imaginative scenario as an un-regressed, highly causal 
story and interrogate its assumptions in order to bring it back closer to the mean.  	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perform when making a present evaluation (Ibid, 186). If we’re assessing, 
for instance, whether or not the trend of wearable computing is worthy of 
consideration, we’ll have to perform some or all of the following 
operations: 
• We seek a causal connection between the evidence of the 
trend’s current influence and it’s importance for the future 
context of our area of exploration. Once a link is discovered, 
our associative memory “quickly and automatically 
constructs the best possible story from the information 
available” (Ibid, 186).  
• The evidence for the trend is evaluated in relationship to a 
relevant norm. For instance, we might do a quick mental 
check to find other examples of information technologies 
that have had significant impact in the past, and add 
wearable technologies to the pile. 
• Next, we substitute our weighing of the potential impact of 
wearables with the historical impact of those technologies 
around which we’ve constructed the norm. We come to 
believe that the performance of the technologies we’ve taken 
as the norm gives us license to ascribe similar potential 
performance to wearables.    
 It shouldn’t be surprising, then, that the work we’ve done 
evaluating trends tends to be simply “ported over” by our inner cognitive 
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misers to reflect their appearance in our future scenarios. After all, our 
minds seem to assure us, how much could the passage of time really matter? 
But of course, the passage of time itself, quite apart from any driver or 
blocker you could name, counts for quite a lot.  
This is certainly not an unknown problem to foresight practitioners. 
As it stands, astute foresight practitioners attempt to stop our trend 
evaluations from becoming overpowered in our images of the future by 
encourage organizations to think as well about countertrends and blockers 
to their chosen trends. Countertrends exist on the same level of analysis as 
our trends, acting as an opposing or competing force; for instance, 
religious conservatism might be a countertrend to liberal secularism. 
Blockers are higher level animating forces on par with drivers that might 
act as a damper to the development of our trends; for instance, future 
budgetary constraints might act as a blocker to the expansion of the 
welfare state. A consideration of countertrends and blockers is no doubt 
essential; it ensures that we do not grant ourselves license to create a 
frictionless passage for our trends as they move into the future by 
throwing opposing causal forces in their path. Countertrends are 
important for another reason: they make it less likely that our future 
images will be homogenous, since it insists that our trends live alongside 
their mirror images, making them more robust and evocative (though this 
might not always be what we want, as we’ll see below).  
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On the other hand, both countertrends and blockers still fit into a 
perfectly causal story about how events unfold. They might be satisfying to 
our minds, which naturally seek to grasp onto causal explanations for 
why things turn out the way they do, but they are far from the whole 
story. Chiefly, the phenomenon of regression to the mean is left out of this 
causal story. Regression doesn’t occur because countertrends exert more 
influence than do our trends, or because blockers get in the way of the 
growth of our trends. In addition to all of this, regression just occurs as a 
probabilistically inevitable consequence of the role that chance, luck, and 
time play in moving things closer to the mean from either direction: as 
Kahneman puts it, “regression to the mean has an explanation, but does 
not have a cause” (Ibid, 178).  
As a general rule, we should assume that trends we feel will have 
low impact will turn out to be more influential than we anticipate, and 
that trends we intuit will have high impact will be less influential; both 
naturally regress toward the mean in the course of time. If there is a 
danger, it is in clinging to a default future of the world, it’s also there in 
the propensity for defaulting to substitution when projecting weak signals 
into the future; in the former case, relying on default futures can cause our 
view of the future to be too similar to the present, and in the latter, too 
dissimilar. When substitution is coupled with the charisma of causal 
explanations of change – especially the charisma of those we craft 
ourselves – we have a recipe for a kind of future myopia quite different 
	  89	  
than the one foresight practitioners typically warn against. Kahneman 
puts it succinctly: “Be warned: your intuitions will deliver predictions that 
are too extreme and you will be inclined to put far too much faith in them” 
(Ibid, 194). 
 
 4.3 Default Futures and Alternate Scenarios 	  
 One of the key claims of strategic foresight is that the act of taking 
into consideration several possible futures naturally loosens the hold of an 
individual’s default mental model of the future, making room for more 
flexibility in the way they conceive of and respond to the future. Just as we 
can reduce the effects of hindsight bias – the feeling that, in regards to how 
things actually turned out, “we knew it all along” – through exploring 
carefully crafted counterfactuals (Fischhoff 1976), so too can we reduce 
attachment to the default future within an organization through creating 
multiple carefully crafted future scenarios.  
 It’s a claim with strong prima facie plausibility, and it’s incorrect. 
Or at least only correct under specific circumstances. It’s a critical mistake 
to assume that investment in the default future always decreases as we 
generate and explore alternative futures; as it turns out, there are several 
situations in which considerations of alternate scenarios can actually 
further entrench commitment to the default future.  
 Psychologists Neal Roese and James Olson uncovered just such a 
counterintuitive inversion in the relationship between hindsight bias and 
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counterfactuals. Hindsight bias is the name for the common feeling of 
“having known it all along”; individuals tend to overrate their confidence 
in having predicted the outcome of an event after the fact, seeing it in 
retrospect as a virtual inevitability. The hindsight bias is more than the 
simple inability to learn from experience. It also represents “an inability to 
retrieve one’s own pre-outcome explanatory perspective” (Rose & Olson 
1995, 198). An oft-quoted passage in the cognitive science literature from 
historian Georges Florovsky keenly sums up the phenomenon: “In 
retrospect, we seem to perceive the logic of events which unfold 
themselves in a regular or linear fashion according to a recognizable 
pattern with an alleged inner necessity. So that we get the impression that 
it really could not have happened otherwise” (Florovsky 1969, 369). 
 It seems reasonable to assume that exposing individuals to 
counterfactual thinking should reduce the effects of hindsight bias. For 
instance, presenting plausible alternate scenarios for how a baseball game 
may have gone otherwise should make even die-hard fans of the victors 
pause to consider ways in which the team might’ve blown the game. One 
reason we might expect this is that counterfactuals increase the pool of 
potentials over which to distribute probabilities. If you present the 
baseball fan with several alternate visions of how their team might’ve lost, 
they’ll be compelled to reduce their confidence on the likelihood of the 
actual outcome.  As we’d expect, it has been demonstrated experimentally 
	  91	  
that the more alternatives to a stated outcome that subjects consider, the 
lower the median likelihoods ascribed to these outcomes (Fischhoff 1976). 
 But it’s not so simple as that. Counterfactuals might reduce 
hindsight bias in certain circumstance, but psychologists Neal Roese and 
James Olson have experimentally demonstrated that counterfactuals can 
in some cased actually heighten the effect of the hindsight bias. When 
individuals have established strong causal chains of inference connecting 
events in the past to actual outcomes, the hindsight bias is stronger 
relative to instances where more random elements are at play, and the 
clearer the outcome is wedded to causal antecedents, the stronger the 
hindsight bias becomes. This effect is strongest when the counterfactuals 
were targeted at undoing the actual outcome.  
 In order to demonstrate this effect, Roese and Olson had subjects 
read a scenario depicting a student preparing for an important exam. The 
student “engages in several preexam undertakings (the target causal 
antecedents), some facilitative and other inhibitory of success on the 
exam” (Roese & Olson 1996, 203). One such action, taking pills for 
combating panic attacks, was alternately portrayed as being either 
consistently or inconsistently correlated with her success on exams in the 
past. In this scenario, the student forgets to take the pills. This leaves it 
open for subjects to contain two counterfactuals: “if she had taken the pill, 
she may have performed better” (the undoing condition) or “if she had 
taken her pill, her performance would have been the same” (the no-
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undoing condition). As Rose and Olson hypothesized, when subjects 
considered the undoing counterfactual, it heightened their hindsight bias 
regarding the actual outcome. When counterfactuals are highly causative, 
and when they are portrayed as possibilities that would’ve undone the 
actual outcome, they can further entrench the feeling that we knew it all 
along.  
 This experimental result points to troubling implications for human 
foresight, as well. Working on the implication of the Janus Hypothesis, 
which suggests that the vagaries of memory can also manifest in the way 
we deal with the future, perhaps foresight bias (which, depending on the 
individual in question, might be based in status quo bias or optimism 
bias) will similarly turn out to be reinforced, rather than weakened, by 
certain types of scenarios or scenario generating methods. If hindsight bias 
is “a projection of new knowledge into the past accompanied by a denial 
that the outcome information has influenced judgments, (Wasserman, 
Lempert, & Hastie 1991, 30) then “foresight bias” might be the projection 
of current knowledge into the future accompanied by an assertion that 
incoming information won’t influence judgments.  
 Of course, the most important asymmetry between judging the 
likelihood of things that have already happened and those that haven’t 
happened yet is outcome knowledge. Simply put, if you know the outcome 
of a causal chain, you are more likely to highly rate the likelihood of that 
outcome against other possible outcomes. But though outcome knowledge 
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is never the case in foresight, there are very likely other factors that 
together cause us to more highly rate the likelihood of certain futures over 
others, such as optimism bias and overconfidence in entrepreneurial 
individuals, or status quo bias in managerial types (Busenitz & Barney, 
1997), polarized organization thinking, groupthink, or any of the raft of 
biases mentioned in Chapter 3. Couple these biases with an organizational 
attachment to the results of market and financial forecasts, which provide 
a causal story about the future, and you have all the components of a 
robust, default future. Put plainly: creating plausible, strongly causative 
possible futures engineered to steer organizations away from their default 
view of the future might actually lead them to perceive the default future 
as more, not less, likely. Luckily, there is nothing stopping foresight 
practitioners from testing this hypothesis using the same experimental 
design as Rose and Olson, simply flipping the scenario script from a 
consideration of the past to a scenario of the future. The Janus Hypothesis 
strongly suggests that we will uncover the same effect, and indeed that is 
what we are finding (Shnaars and Topol 1987; Kuhn and Sniezek, 1996).    
 But neither should we exclusively build scenarios that are 
deliberately unlikely in an attempt to offset commitment to the default 
future. Consideration of wildcard scenarios – highly impacting, highly 
improbable future events, or Black Swans to use Nassim Taleb’s coinage – 
can also prop up the default future, as can scenarios that are improbable 
and merely run of the mill in terms of their impact. Psychologist Michael 
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Dougherty and his co-investigators examined how the likelihood that 
individuals attached to focal causal scenarios about the past was altered 
through consideration of alternate scenarios. In order to frame their 
discussion, they discuss speculation surrounding the crash of Flight 800 
over the Atlantic Ocean in 1996. The initial investigation surrounding the 
crash focused on a causal scenario in which a terrorist had planted and 
detonated a bomb on the plane, though after the most exhaustive and 
expensive air disaster investigation in U.S. history it was determined that 
the most probable cause was an explosion of flammable air vapors inside a 
fuel tank. Dougherty and his co-researchers hypothesized that there were 
at least two ways that newscasters and investigators may have initially 
become overconfident in the terrorism-based causal scenarios explaining 
the crash.   
  First, “the newscasters and investigators may have completely 
failed to generate alternative causal scenarios”, in which case the cause of 
overconfidence is a kind of causal myopia (arguably similar to the 
phenomenon of default futures). Second, the newscasters and 
investigators might have generated alternative scenarios, but “judged 
them to be so unlikely that they were discounted or eliminated from 
serious consideration” (Dougherty et al. 1997, 137). This suggests that 
there is a sort of perceived plausibility threshold below which scenarios 
are simply discarded in mental reckoning. This is a phenomenon that 
should be familiar for many foresight practitioners: one or more scenarios 
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is left dangling outside the discussion because it has failed to make it into 
the ring of “leading contenders” for plausible futures, for any number of 
reasons. The research by Dougherty and his co-investigators strongly 
suggests that not only do these scenarios have virtually no impact on 
reducing the perceived plausibility of focal causal scenarios; they may 
actually increase their perceived plausibility. 
 In order to test this hypothesis, the investigators presented subjects 
with the following script, constructed to be strongly suggestive of a focal 
causal scenario, with information about other potential causal scenarios 
omitted: 
It was the smokiest fire that Bill had seen in his eight years as a 
firefighter. Bill thought he could handle the fire by himself while 
the others went to get a second hose. He entered through the main 
entrance on the second floor. It immediately became clear that he 
would have to make it to the basement in order to extinguish the 
fire. The smoke from the fire made it especially difficult for Bill to 
see where he was going. He soon became disoriented and had no 
idea how long he had been in the building or how far he had 
traveled into the building. Nevertheless, Bill hosed down the fire 
while he waited for help. Unfortunately, by the time his co-workers 
reached him, Bill was dead (Ibid, 141). 
 
 The script is meant to be suggestive of a focal casual scenario in 
which Bill died from smoke inhalation, and was found to illicit this 
scenario through beta testing.  
 In addition to this generic version of the script, the experimenters 
devised two additional scripts with added content. The second script was 
intended to make alternative explanations for Bill’s death more likely by 
adding the following elements:  
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It was a relatively hot fire 
The building was made primarily of wood beams, as it was a relatively old 
building (Ibid, 144). 
 The third script was intended to make alternative explanations for 
Bill’s death less likely through adding the following elements: 
It was a relatively cool fire. 
The building was made primarily of steel beams and concrete, as it was a 
relatively new building (Ibid, 144) 
 As we can see from the figure below, subjects rated the focal 
scenario as slightly less likely when additional information was added 
making alternatives more likely, and slightly more likely when additional 
information was added making alternatives less likely.  
 	  
Table 2. Mean likelihood of the focal causal scenarios for the three conditions described in 
Dougherty et al. 1997. When alternative explanations for a scenario seem less probably 
than a focal explanation, rating of likelihood of the focal explanation actually increases 
relative to a situation in which no alternative is offered to the focal explanation.  
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 Of course, neither of these findings demonstrate beyond doubt that 
the same tendencies to react to certain types of alternative scenarios with 
increased confidence in default scenarios applies in the same way to 
future thinking. But the possibility should give us foresight practitioners 
pause, and press us to investigate further. As a start, we should at least 
cast some skepticism on the common claim that the act of considering 
multiple possible futures unfailingly loosens the hold that the default 
future has on us. If these same pitfalls apply to future thinking, it seems 
more likely that in crafting future scenarios for the purposes uprooting 
default futures we must carefully and deliberately steer between 
Charybdis and Scylla. 
 
 4.4 Probabilistic Reasoning and Scenario 
Planning 	  
 We can see from the above discussion that another common 
injunction in foresight – that we not attach probabilities to future scenarios 
and instead consider them as mere possibilities – is asking the impossible. 
Both Pierre Wack and Herman Kahn wished to avoid attaching 
probabilities to scenarios for fear of limiting engagement to those 
scenarios that were deemed most probable; their aim, after all, was to 
“stimulate senior management thinking about the future, not to provide 
forecasts of the most likely futures” in line with financial and statistical 
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methods that had “become the opiate of corporate strategy” (Millett 2009, 
62). But whether probability figures are on a workshop whiteboard or 
implicit in the confidence weighting individuals mentally ascribe to them, 
scenarios are always already being probabilistically assessed. Ignoring these 
naturally occurring probability weightings only allows them to secretly 
and freely influence scenario and strategy development, and potentially 
creates heavy anchors or irrational resistance in an individual’s mind, 
subtly biasing them toward certain scenarios and strategies.  
 Rather than pretend that these probabilities do not factor into the 
scenario exercise, we should face them head on and ensure that the 
influence of scenarios on our thinking is reasonably de-biased; not either 
disproportionately strong or weak given the mental frame in which we 
interpret them. One potential solution is to have individuals declare their 
Bayesian priors ahead of scenario development in order to assess their 
confidence in a selection of propositions that illustrate the default future of 
their organization. In his well-known work “An Essay Toward Solving a 
Problem in the Doctrine of Chances”, English minister Thomas Bayes 
formulated an account of how people naturally formulate probabilistic 
estimates about the way the world works, and provides a method for 
rationally updating these estimates in accordance with new knowledge. 
Bayesian priors are the probabilities we assign to certain events, based on 
previous knowledge, intuition, and expectations; they are the machinery 
that powers up our default mental images of the future.  
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  Declaring our priors and thinking through how new knowledge 
will impact our judgment can help us to connect imaginative future 
scenarios to a method for rationally grappling with uncertainty. As Nate 
Silver writes, successful forecasters of any kind “do not think of the future 
in terms of no-lose bets, unimpeachable theories, and infinitely precise 
measurements,” but instead as “speckles of probability, flickering upward 
and downward like a stock market ticker to every new jolt of information” 
(Silver 2012, 238). A Bayesian approach doesn’t attach probabilities to 
scenarios. Rather, it provides us a means of rationally updating our 
assumptions about the world when presented with new knowledge.  
 After a lengthy period of dormancy, Bayesian models are “on the 
ascent throughout the cognitive sciences”, especially in the psychology of 
reasoning (Elqayam et al. 2013, 454). This new paradigm represents a 
break from the traditional deduction-based paradigm, “which took 
classical, binary logic as an appropriate model for human deductive 
competence and marginalized the role of prior beliefs and desires (Ibid, 
454). The Bayesian paradigm of the psychology of reasoning represents 
“the shift from truth to belief”; rather than simply assert whether or not 
you agree with some proposition, it is crucial to report the degree to which 
you believe or disbelieve it, and provide justification for the degree of your 
belief. Only then can we begin to understand the actual dynamics of 
interactions between existing mental models and new knowledge. 
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 Let’s imagine that an individual from the marketing division in a 
company that manufacturers biosensors believes there is a 50% chance 
that in five years time the wearable technology market will be 
approaching the size of the smartphone market. This is her prior (x). She is 
presented with a scenario in which Google Glass is launched in early 2014 
and is a complete flop. How should she update her priors based on this 
hypothetical event? First, she needs to estimate the probability of Google 
Glass flopping if her prediction in the market success of wearables is 
correct. This possibility makes her feel slightly bearish on wearables, but 
she still believes there are other avenues to growing the market, so let’s 
say she assigns a 13% likelihood (y) of her initial claim given this event. 
Finally, she needs to estimate the probability that her initial belief is false 
given the hypothetical terrible reception of Glass in 2014. She admits that 
the development would not bode well for the market, so she assigns this 
35% likelihood (z). Once we’ve estimated these values, we can apply 
Bayes’ theorem (the algebraic expression in the final line of the table 
below) to establish how our imaginary marketer should update her belief 




	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 This method for elucidating Bayes’ theorem is adapted from Nate Silver’s 
account in The Signal and the Noise.  
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PRIOR PROBABILITY   
Initial estimate of how likely it is that the 
wearables market will be as large as the 
smartphone market by 2018.  
x 50% 
SCENARIO EVENT: GOOGLE GLASS FLOPS 
The probability of wearables matching 
smartphone market given the failure of Google 
Glass 
y 13% 
The probability that wearables will fall short of the 




Revised estimate of how likely it is that the 
wearables market will rival smartphones given the 
failure of Google Glass.  
𝑥𝑦𝑥𝑦 + 𝑧(1− 𝑥) 27% 
 Table 3 Bayesian analysis of Google Glass scenario 
 Based on an application of Bayesian reasoning, given the flop of 
Google Glass and her own confidence ratings, our imaginary marketer 
should be about half as confident about the prospects of the wearables 
market matching the smartphone market by 2018; a significant change, but 
not exactly a catastrophic collapse in confidence. Note however that 
without making her priors clear and thinking deliberately through how 
her belief would be impacted given this new information, there’s a good 
chance that her confidence levels would be lead by other considerations, 
such as group norms, or her emotional reaction to elements of the scenario 
under consideration, causing her either to under adjust or over adjust her 
estimates. All that Bayes’ theorem does is provide an operation for “how 
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base rates should be integrated with new evidence to produce posterior 
probabilities” (Ibid, 459).  
 As foresight practitioner Stephen Millet points out, both scenario 
generating teams and executives “gravitate toward the scenarios they find 
to be “most interesting,” which typically reflect corporate culture biases 
and wishful thinking” (Millet 2009, 65). Application of Bayesian reasoning 
can loosen the hold these scenarios have on us and lead us to carefully 
think through scenarios that have less impact and appeal. It can also 
loosen the effects of the anchoring bias, which makes us cling strongly to 
initial estimates (even implicit ones) and resist movement away from this 
norm; Bayes’ theorem serves as external evidence that we might be overly 
invested in our initial estimates, especially in light of compelling evidence 
that we may be mistaken.  
 The use of Bayesian reasoning also encourages people to give 
substance to their judgments, which can generate fruitful discussions and 
“expose hidden assumptions, biases and expectations that too often go 
unarticulated in the generation of purely intuitive scenarios” (Ibid, 65). 
Noting where priors are particularly strong or weak can give foresight 
strategists important clues about the default future in an organization, and 
how this future is socialized and differently weighted in different areas of 
the organization. Imagine, for instance, that Bayesian analysis reveals that 
the marketing team has a far higher prior belief than the engineering team 
in the pending boom in wearable technology. This finding would no 
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doubt be an important jumping off point for discussion and broader 
strategic alignment within the organization.  
 What we know of the way that people spontaneously update their 
beliefs suggests we often run afoul of Bayes’ theorem. For instance, people 
frequently neglect base rates when making inferences; if asked whether it 
is more likely that a man with long black hair wearing a death metal t-
shirt is a Satanist or a Christian, people will tend to answer that is he more 
likely to be a Satanist, despite the fact that Christians number over two 
billion people and Satanists only a few thousand worldwide. The order in 
which people are exposed to new information seems to have an impact on 
their degree of belief (in other words, belief updating is diachronic) even 
though “the temporal order in which information is integrated should 
make no difference” (Ibid, 459). Lastly, an individual’s existing mental 
models have a powerful inertial quality: “because holding on to the 
existing model takes up far less cognitive effort than revising or 
discarding it, beliefs are not always updated even in the face of new 
information“ (Ibid, 460). Bayesian analysis - and indeed all of the methods 
suggested in this chapter, as well as the foresight methodology itself - 
presumes that “human rationality is fallible but corrigible” (Ibid, 459). 
There is evidence to suggest that using Bayes’ theorem in a pedagogical 
way can reduce the effects of phenomenon like base-rate neglect, 
diachronic belief updating, and mental model inertia. The most obvious 
way in which this takes place is when subjects explicitly endorse Bayesian 
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analysis and other methods that impose a normative structure on belief 
updating. In an introduction to the work of Amos Tversky, psychologist 
Elda Shafir stresses this point: “The research showed that people’s 
judgments often violate basic normative principles. At the same time, it 
showed that they exhibit sensitivity to these principles’ normative appeal” 
(Shafir 2003, x).  
 If foresight is to be a valid process for examining and improving 
our mental models of the future, then an examination of priors should be 
an integral part of the process. We shouldn’t mistake the acts of scenario 
creation and socialization as adequate for the purposes of shaking up 
thinking and changing mental models. If not accompanied with the proper 
frame for understanding scenarios, foresight activities can actually 
introduce more uncertainty into an organization, not less, by driving 
individuals and groups deeper into their unconscious biases. Activities for 
examining and updating priors should go hand in hand with periodically 
renewed trend analysis and foresight activities. Bayesian reasoning 
exercises might also be especially powerful when used in conjunction with 
the results of backcasting techniques; participants could then wind tunnel 
strategies and assess their beliefs at every temporal point in the backcast to 
get a sense of how their probabilistic assessments change with each new 
piece of information.  
 Millet’s ends his examination of the use of probabilities in scenarios 
by suggesting that “if the use of probabilities with scenarios fits the 
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corporate culture and stimulates creative thinking about alternative 
strategies under alternative conditions, then they should be used.” He 
even goes so far as to suggest that probabilities should only enter into the 
conversation if the scenario team “is familiar and comfortable with the 
concept of Bayesian probabilities” (Ibid, 66). No doubt, the use of algebraic 
equations and probability theory would probably frighten foresight teams 
that are not accustomed to dealing in the quantitative aspects of their 
organizations. But although the algebraic expression used to update priors 
is daunting and somewhat arcane for laypeople, the heart of Bayesian 
reasoning is rather simple. An organization called the Center for Applied 
Rationality (CFAR) has had success recently in instructing teams and 
entrepreneurs in the art of applied rationality, including simple and 
intuitive exercises that introduce them to Bayesian reasoning and 
demonstrate its utility in everyday situations.21 Foresight practitioners 
could learn a lot from their friendly and intuitive approach to probing 
mental models. For instance, CFAR has devised an exercise that 
“gamifies” the creation of Bayesian priors and the process of updating 
them based on new events and evidence by structuring these activities 
around an unfolding, engaging murder mystery. Similar techniques, using 
elements of the narrative elements of created scenarios, could serve as a 
powerful tool for participants to explore how unfolding events would 
impact their judgments and decision-making processes. For instance, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 http://rationality.org/ 
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participants could be sequentially led through the results of backcasting 
exercises in order to better understand the impact of unfolding events on 
the strength of their prior beliefs.   
 
 4.5 Motivated Reasoning and Tangible   
 Futures 	  
 As foresight practitioner Karl Schroeder has pointed out, scenarios 
are “highly charismatic artifacts” that may draw attention away from the 
serious and essential work yet to be done in a foresight exercise: using 
scenarios as a backdrop in front of which to perform strategic assessments 
(personal communication, November 18 2013). With scenarios, more vivid 
is therefore not always better. The aesthetics of scenarios might well 
distract from, rather than enhance, strategic thinking.  
 But it’s not only that scenarios are potential diversions. Scenarios 
also often have a strong affective quality; in order to increase their 
perceived plausibility, they are designed to engage individuals on an 
emotional level through use of techniques like narrative, science 
fictioning, and visualization. The affective components of scenarios and 
other aesthetically striking elements of the foresight methodology are 
usually understood as positive attributes because they can make 
provocative ideas more plausible and relatable; the combination of 
plausibility and provocation is, after all, the hallmark of good scenario 
design. Plausible, provocative scenarios are those that are close enough to 
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reality to achieve buy-in from foresight consumers, but simultaneously 
jarring or unexpected in some fundamental way that motivates 
individuals to treat them as puzzles to solve in the process of strategic 
work.  
 However, provocation in this context is a little ambiguous. Are we 
provoking careful, considered engagement with our scenario worlds, or are 
we provoking visceral, emotional responses that lead to irrational gut 
reactions? In our scenarios, are we speaking to System 1, System 2, or 
both? And which is our primary audience? These affective elements create 
opportunities for motivated reasoning in which individuals might be either 
unconsciously enticed or repulsed by the emotive components of 
representations of the future, leading them to biased strategic thinking. 
“The affective forecasting bias leads us to exaggerate the emotional 
satisfaction of a future success and the devastation of a failure,” notes 
Thomas Suddendorf. The reality, he notes, is that “we typically don’t get 
as excited as we thought we might at success, and we handle failure much 
better than we imagine.” Strangely, the bias persists even in the face of 
persistent evidence that we are poor forecasters of our future emotional 
states: “We experience the reality, but we don’t update our minds,” 
Suddendorf notes, “we keep the exaggeration going” (personal 
communication, January 29, 2014).  
 We should note that the question of motivated reasoning is not 
only a problem of scenario exercises. Indeed, as access to multimedia 
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technologies and their ease of use increase, opportunities arise to inject 
emotion-generating components into various steps of the foresight 
methodology, creating new opportunities for foresight consumers to 
engage in motivated reasoning. The tangible futures method and its sister 
methods (future artifacts, experiential futures, etc.) are increasingly used 
in foresight activities and are perhaps the most obvious place to begin 
asking questions about the impact of the affective qualities of foresight on 
motivated reasoning.  
 In an interview with futurist Stuart Candy on the topic, design 
strategist Vince Lombardi, who pioneered the use of tangible futures, 
provides the following definition: “Tangible Futures are the output of 
applying design-fueled disciplines like visualization, drama, and film to 
represent futures and strategies” (Lombardi 2008).22 Describing the 
development of tangible futures, Lombardi provides the framing question 
that drove him and his co-worker Christina Wodtke: “How can we help 
managers experience futures and strategy so that it can be more 
substantially understood, shared, and acted on” (Ibid.)? In Bringing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 In the same interview, Lombardi claims that tangible futures are part of the 
solution to an over-reliance of what he calls the “cognitive” elements of strategy, 
by which he means that strategy “rarely exists outside of our minds.” I do not 
think that he intends the same thing by “cognitive” as I do in this essay; he seems 
to rather be using it as a way to describe the space occupied by “proverbial 
binders of reports” which do not significantly engage managers. All the same, we 
shouldn’t fool ourselves into thinking that artifacting on its own is enough to 
ensure that individuals think more deeply about the futures they’re being 
presented. It may sometimes do the opposite by appealing directly to System 1, 
which is my primary claim in this section.  
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Future to Life, digital futurist Trevor Haldenby articulates another facet of 
the rationale for using tangible and experiential futures:  
Through the creation of physical artifacts, interactive environments, 
cinematic narratives, and social communities, futurists with 
varying approaches and goals are telling stories that make 
speculative scenarios more engaging to non-specialist audiences 
(Haldenby 2013, 58). 
 
 No doubt, the use of multimedia is effective both for the purposes 
of driving engagement, as well as democratizing and socializing the 
findings of foresight activities. For these reasons, as well as the increasing 
availability and ease of use of the technologies enabling these methods, we 
should expect that foresight practitioners will incorporate more 
multimedia elements into the methodology moving forward.  
 But in this process, we should not lose sight of the fact that 
foresight generates material which makes participants uncomfortable in 
that it emphasizes the “uncertainty, instability, and precariousness” of the 
future over images that “underline surety or make accurate predictions” 
(Healey and Hodgkinson 2007, 578). And if participants experience this 
discomfort even when scenarios are merely text on a page, we should 
expect that the negative affective dimensions of scenarios would only be 
amplified when they’re built into vibrant multi-media worlds.  
 Why is this a bad thing? Of course, scenarios should be provocative; 
Kees van der Heijden and his colleagues suggest that scenarios that exert 
the strongest influence on decision making are those that “elicit feelings of 
fear, hope, security, and threat” because these emotional states “create the 
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jolt needed for action” (van der Heijden et al. 2002, 263). But much of what 
we’ve learned about the effects of subjecting people to uncertainty 
suggests that exposure to provocative material might make it less likely 
that they do the hard work of thinking through its meanings slowly and 
carefully. Instead, decision makers may instead consider scenarios with 
reference to “an affective reaction to a salient image, and this feeing (not 
explicit consideration of the scenario’s probability) may guide behavior” 
(Hsee and Rottenstreich 2004, 28). Healy and Hodgkinson provide a small 
litany of the potential negative effects of uncertainty on the overreliance 
on affective reasoning:  “… perceived uncertainty over anticipated events, 
decisions, and their outcomes has been linked with rigidity and slower 
decision making, escalation of commitment to a failing course of action, 
and increased interpersonal conflict and reduced performance among 
decision making groups” (Ibid, 578). 
 An anecdote related by Healey and Hodgkinson illustrates this 
potential pitfall. A team of foresight strategists attempted to use scenario 
planning techniques to help a publishing firm explore their business 
context so that they could develop an adaptive strategy that addressed 
critical uncertainties in the volatile publishing industry head on. The 
result was a set of scenarios that drove the publishing company’s 
management team into a reactive, defensive posture: “In constructing the 
scenarios, the management team focused on envisioning quite vividly a 
threatening future in which technological changes would replace their 
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main offering, to the extent that this triggered defensive avoidance and 
threat rigidity effects” (Ibid 579). 
  Defensive avoidance and rigidity are both strategies invoked by 
highly negative emotional stimuli. In the former, decision makers will 
default to “choosing strategies that deflect the responsibility on to other 
individuals or on to factors outside the chooser’s control (Foskett and 
Hemsley-Brown 2001, 41), while in the latter they “reduce their flexibility 
under a stress situation, sealing off new information and controlling 
deviant responses” (Janis 1972; Staw et al 1981, 502). Healey and 
Hodgkinson continue their analysis of the event: 
Consequently, they were unable to reach a consensus on an 
alternative to the current failing strategy. This proved to be 
anything but an anhedonic response. The scenario intervention 
“raised the levels of decisional stress and conflict within the group 
to unacceptably high levels” (Hodgkinson and Wright 2002, 964). 
The stress created by attempting to face an uncertain future with a 
disparate team led the decision makers to adopt a variety of 
dysfunctional coping strategies, including bolstering commitment 
to the current failing strategy, procrastinating, and shifting 
responsibility for maintaining the inert status quo to other 
stakeholders within the firm (Healey and Hodgkinson 2008, 579-
581). 
 
 It is hard here not to be reminded of the biological concept of a 
supernormal stimulus. In her book Supernormal Stimuli: How Primal Urges 
Overran Their Evolutionary Purpose, psychologist Deidre Barrett provides a 
quintessential illustration:  
Nobel laureate Niko Tinbergen coined this term after his animal 
research revealed that experimenters could create phony targets 
that appealed to instincts more than the original objects for which 
they’d evolved. He studied birds that lay small, pale blue eggs 
specked with gray and found they preferred to sit on giant, bright 
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blue ones with black polka dots. The essence of the supernormal 
stimulus is that the exaggerated imitation can exert a stronger pull 
than the real thing (Barrett 2010, 3).  
 
 In effect, tangible and experiential futures are a supernormal 
experience when contrasted with the native foresight abilities of human 
beings. If they are doing their job properly by provoking us to confront 
tangible and experiential futures – an immediacy that has no match in the 
evolutionary landscape - we should expect supernormal responses to these 
methods.   
 But those supernormal responses are not different in kind to the 
normal responses we have to prospection. As we’ve seen, projecting 
ourselves into the future can help us formulate plans with greater fidelity 
and prepare for potential uncertainties. But it can lead us to overcommit to 
futures that we haven’t thought through sufficiently, or even to become 
anxious and paralyzed in the face of future possibilities. Tangible futures 
can amplify our natural, unreflective optimism about the future; they can 
also raise the plethora of fears and anxieties we experience in the face of 
pressing risks and uncertainties. As a method for provoking thinking 
about the future, creating supernormal stimuli from imagined scenarios is 
not a poor strategy per se, but if executed improperly it can lead us ever 
further down the path of poor future thinking and strategic decision 
making.   
 There may also be good evolutionary reasons that we are attracted 
to strong narratives about the future: they galvanize action around a 
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shared vision. “It’s adaptive to exaggerate these emotions because they 
allow us to coax other people into joining us,” Suddendorf says. As a 
social mechanism, he notes a parallel between affective forecasting and the 
practice of self deception as described by biologist Robert Trivers. Both 
present the same puzzle: the practice of creating overly optimistic (or 
pessimistic) visions of the future, or hiding our true motivations for our 
actions via self deception, seems like it should be maladaptive, since it 
causes us to hide key affective and motivational information from even 
ourselves. Why, then, did these habits persist in our evolutionary history? 
Trivers hypothesis was that we self deceive in order to be better a 
deceiving others. Suddendorf suggests that, similarly, “we exaggerate 
how wonderful it would be if we could achieve X in order to coax people 
into cooperating and join in our vision.” Moreover, “if you believe your 
own exaggerated emotions, than if people found out you were leading 
them astray you aren’t punished as much” (Suddendorf). This explanation 
should give us pause. If it’s true, then our tendency to engage in 
unconscious affective forecasting is ultimately about protecting our own 
hides from group censure and the cheater-punishing tendency inherent in 
our social intelligence.23 Foresight strategists steeped in the evolutionary 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
23 The human urge to punish cheaters is uncannily strong. Consider the two 
variations of the Wason selection task. In the basic test, participants are shown a 
set of four cards place on a table, each of which has a number on one side and a 
colored patch on the other. The visible sides of the cards show the numbers 3 and 
8, and the colors red and brown. Experimenters ask participants to test the truth 
of the following proposition “if a card shows an even number on one face, then 
it’s opposite face is red” by turning over only those cards which will decide the 
truth of the proposition. Following the rules of classical logic, the only cards that 
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rationale for affective forecasting take note: allowing participants to 
generate unrealistically optimistic futures without putting a check on the 
process might be more about self-preservation – on both their part and 
your own – than about creating compelling visions of the future.  
 None of this should be taken to mean that we should never employ 
rich, imaginative, multi-media content within the context of strategic 
foresight; instead, there may be situations in which it is appropriate, and 
situations in which it is not. Or we may need to embed additional 
information or controls into the process to ensure that we are not 
unintentionally creating opportunities for highly motivated reasoning in 
participants – unless, of course, that is what we want, as may be the case 
when we are trying to elicit preferred futures.   
 At this point, we simply don’t know enough to say with any degree 
of certainty which of these situations we’re in during a foresight activity. 
Mark P. Healey put his finger on the difficulty of assessing the efficacy of 
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can disprove the proposition are the 8 and brown card: if the 8 card is brown on 
the other side, or if the brown card has an even number on the other side, then 
the rule is violated.  Only 10% of participants correctly choose these two cards. 
However, if the colors and numbers are replaced “16 years old”, “drinking beer”, 
“25 years old”, and “drinking water” and the proposition to be tested is changed 
to “if you are drinking alcohol then you must be over 18”, participants fare much 
better. It seems perfectly clear that you should check what the 16 year old is 
drinking as well as the age of the individual drinking the beer; checking what the 
25 year old is drinking or the age of the water drinker can do nothing to detect 
whether a rule violation is taking place. According to Leda Cosmides and John 
Tooby, the fact that participants fare much better on the “social rule” version of 
the Wason selection tests strongly suggests that human reasoning is governed by 
context-sensitive mechanisms that have evolved to solve specific problems of 
social interaction, rather than context-free, general-purpose mechanisms. 	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We don't know enough about the psychology of how people think 
about and deal with uncertainty in a more general sense. We know 
a lot about making probability judgments under uncertainty from 
the Kahneman and Tversky tradition, but we don't know a lot 
about the trade offs between the motivational benefits and their 
essential cognitive downsides. And that makes it difficult to figure 
out whether these types of techniques are useful. And we really 
don't know enough about the techniques themselves (personal 
communication, November 20, 2013). 
 
 Whatever we discover about the extent to which cognitive and 
affective reasoning are impacted through the use of multimedia in 
illustrating scenarios, we should consider using either facilitation practices 
of additional methods that allow for careful handling both of the 
unwarranted optimism and anchoring effects of positive scenarios and “of 
the anxiety and decisional stress that can arise when users imagine and 
simulate future threats with scenarios” (Healey and Hodgkinson 2007, 
581).  
 Futurist Jim Dator has argued that all images of the future tend to 
fall into one of four broad categories: scenarios of continued growth, 
driven by a faith in new technologies and market forces; scenarios of 
collapse, rooted in “concerns about overpopulation, energy and other 
resource exhaustion, and environmental pollution”; scenarios of 
discipline, based in the belief that “continued economic growth is either 
undesirable or unsustainable,” and so we should revisit “fundamental 
values – natural, spiritual, religious, political, or cultural” in order to bring 
growth to heel in the name of “survival and fair distribution”; or scenarios 
of transformation, which posit that radical technological transformations 
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such as “robotics and artificial intelligence, genetic engineering, 
nanotechnology, teleportation, space settlement” will lead to the 
“emergence of a ‘dream society’ as the successor to the ‘information 
society’” (Dator 2009, 10).  
 It is worthwhile noting that each of these scenario types carries 
motivational weight. As Dator himself points out, scenarios of continued 
growth are especially attractive to those from the worlds of modern 
government, educational systems, and organizations, while collapse 
scenarios motivate the efforts of those involved in social or environmental 
causes. Scenarios of discipline are highly motivating for religious and 
moral authorities, while scenarios of transformation appeal to those who 
put their faith in the disruptive power of technological innovation. Each of 
these groups sees in their preferred future a strongly uni-directional and 
causal story that can be read as a manifestation of unchecked motivated 
forecasting. Dator also notes the connection between an individual or 
group’s preferred future and their tendency to be swayed by biased 
thinking, and agrees that the origin of these generic images of the future 
might “represent fundamental human biases”:  
It is very important to understand that individuals strongly assume 
that whatever is happening now (in their opinion) will continue: if 
times are good, the default assumption is they will continue to get 
better. If times are bad, they will get worse. This presumption of the 
future as the present continued made total sense for tens of 
thousands of years and is deeply ingrained in all of us, biologically 
and psychologically – and culturally (personal communication, 
February 21, 2014).  
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 Given that overshooting the mean might be a hardwired 
component of human foresight, we should be looking for ways to mitigate 
this effect in strategic foresight engagements. Dator’s own strategy for 
fighting bias in a client’s vision of the future is to ensure that “preferred 
futures visioning take place late in the overall futures project, after many 
other things have been experienced.” Most importantly, clients should 
have “experience in at least two of the generic alternative futures,” as 
described above (Ibid 2014).   
 Another potential strategy for coping with the affective 
components of uncertainty that drive us away from the mean is to situate 
the strategic decisions under consideration within a reference class of 
similar past initiatives. Reference class forecasting, a method developed 
out of the theories of Kahneman and Tversky a project’s potential 
outcomes with those of similar, past projects to produce more accurate 
predictions” (Lovallo and Kahneman 2003, 1). Rather than forecasting 
trends, reference class forecasting asks us to reassess our projections for a 
project’s success by locating its reference class, assessing the distribution 
of outcomes in that class, predicting our project’s position in that 
distribution, and then adjusting our intuitive prediction based on how we 
feel our predictions have performed in the past (Ibid, 1).  Lovallo and 
Kahneman provide a sample reference class forecasting description, which 
here appears in an abridge form: 
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1. Select a reference class: Identifying the right reference class 
involves both art and science. The key is to choose a class that is 
broad enough to be statistically meaningful but narrow enough 
to be truly comparable to the project at hand.  
2. Assess the distribution of outcomes: Once the reference class is 
chosen, you have to document the outcomes of the prior 
projects and arrange them as a distribution, showing the 
extremes, the median, and any clusters.  
3. Make an intuitive prediction of your project’s position in the 
distribution: Based on your own understanding of the project at 
hand and how it compares with the projects in the reference 
class, predict where would fall along the distribution.  
4. Assess the reliability of your prediction: This step is intended 
to gauge the reliability of the forecast you made in Step 3. The 
goal is to estimate the correlation between the forecast and the 
actual outcome, expressed as a coefficient between 0 and 1, 
where 0 indicates no correlation and 1 indicates complete 
correlation. In the best case, information will be available on 
how well your past predictions matched the actual outcomes. In 
the absence of such information, assessments of predictability 
become more subjective. You may, for instance, be able to arrive 
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at an estimate of predictability based on how the situation at 
hand compares with other forecasting situations.  
5. Correct the intuitive estimate: Due to bias, the intuitive 
estimate made in Step 3 will likely be optimistic – deviating too 
far from the average outcome of the reference class. In this final 
step, you adjust the estimate toward the average based on your 
analysis of predictability in Step 4. The less reliable the 
prediction, the more the estimate needs to be regressed toward 
the mean (Ibid, 8). 
  Not only can reference class forecasting ameliorate the biases 
arising from affective reasoning, it can also render a more accurate, 
realistic picture of the prospects of strategic directions. However, it’s 
utility might be limited to cases in which foresight participants are 
laboring under an overoptimistic view of the future due to affective 
reasoning. In this case, reference class forecasting can help to re-plant the 
team’s feet firmly on the ground. But it might not do the same for teams 
who experience option paralysis or buck-passing when confronted with 
unfavorable future scenarios; reference class forecasting, especially if the 
results suggest that their solution sits at the bottom end of the distribution 
of project performance, may further “depress” foresight teams, driving 
them deeper into affective biases that color decision-making. In this case, 
our best bet might be to focus on “developing a supportive psychological 
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climate” aimed at “reducing anxiety, maintaining a future-focus, and 
alleviating avoidant and dysfunctional behavior” (Healey and 
Hodgkinson 2007, 581).  
 We should not preclude the possibility that this might include 
strategies to dampen the aesthetic presentation of scenarios. Healey and 
Hodgkinson recommend use of low-fidelity scenarios in situations where 
individuals might become anchored in one scenario world: “Regularly 
analyzing multiple scenarios in a fast and simple manner, rather than 
elaborately and infrequently, is another potentially useful means of 
reducing scenario anchoring effects” (Ibid, 581). Low-fidelity scenarios 
might also be useful in situations where fear and anxiety in the face of 
uncertainty has made a team’s thinking rigid and reactionary.  
 
 4.6 Findings 	  
Before the revolution of behavioral economics, decision scientists 
were working under the assumption that human beings were perfectly 
rational agents that always acted in such a way as to maximize their 
utility. The work of Kahneman and Tversky demonstrated instead that 
humans were often led astray by biased thinking process that could lead 
to decisions that didn’t best serve them. Their work also highlighted the 
fact that humans always had to make decisions under conditions of 
imperfect knowledge; in this important way, their rationality was 
bounded by imperfect information, timing considerations, and the 
	  121	  
shortcomings of our evolved decision-making processes in the face of 
complex environments and barely perceived risks.  
In similar fashion to the decision scientists who were working 
under the assumption that humans were perfectly rational agents, the 
current practice of strategic foresight relies on an overly simplified and 
essentialized understanding of the ways in which human beings think 
about the future. This set of assumptions has lead foresight strategists to 
make blunt assumptions about human future thinking.  
One clear example is the unstated assumption among foresight 
strategists that presenting individuals with multiple possible scenarios of 
the future naturally loosens the hold of their default mental model of the 
future by distributing their intuitive probabilistic weightings across a 
broader range of possibilities. Granted, this is sometimes exactly what 
happens when people are presented with multiple scenarios of the future, 
but this outcome is predicated on a very specific set of preconditions: that 
the alternate futures do not trigger threat rigidity, and that they present 
causal stories which can compete at parity with that of the default future, 
for instance. Under strictly defined parameters, we can also expect 
humans to be perfectly rational actors. But the real world arguably almost 
never provides us with these perfect decision-making guardrails.  
Another is the propensity for humans to overweight certain threats 
and underweigh others based solely on how legible they are to our mental 
decision making machinery. Perhaps as a result of the important role 
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forming and keeping track of alliances played in human evolution, we 
also tend to overweigh the risks associated with threats that are highly 
causal and agent-centered in nature, and underweigh those risks that do 
not emanate from agents and cannot be encapsulated into neat narratives. 
Highly causal, agent-driven future scenarios exploit  our tendency to be 
cognitive misers: because these scenarios are easier to process than highly 
distributed, non-causal, and non-agent driven scenarios, our minds prefer 
to think through the former while tabling the latter or treating them with 
less attention and enthusiasm. The problem is that those non-causal, non-
agent driven scenarios of the future – most imminently, the possibility of 
high disruptive climate changes – that pose humanity’s greatest challenge 
today.   
Even without these nuances, the foresight methodology is an 
important addition to humanity’s mental toolkit. The question before us 
now is how to sharpen this tool. In the concluding chapter, I will examine 
strategic foresight as a mental tool, and suggest ways strategic foresight 
can be transformed into a living laboratory designed to investigate human 
future thinking and formulate new ways with which groups of humans 






5. Conclusion: Strategic Foresight as a 
Cognitive Toolkit 	  
 As biological anthropologist Terrence Deacon points out in his 
book Incomplete Nature: How Mind Emerged from Matter, everything that 
humans purposefully build – from tools to structures to policy – points to 
some aspect of the future: a set of stairs anticipates that people will ascend 
them; a hammer portends the need to affix materials together; a zoning 
plan preconfigures the space of a future neighborhood development. 
Humans constantly heed the call of the future. Though immaterial and 
acausal, it beckons us into engagements with the present and 
reconsiderations of the past on its behalf. 
 But just because we design for the future does not mean that we do 
so with clear foresight. Of the many things that future historians will find 
curious about the first half of the 20th century, one of them may well be the 
enthusiastic and self-assured way in which powerful professionals sought 
to restructure whole societies and economies around ideological grand 
narratives that articulated future states of utopia. Efforts toward 
improvement within these political regimes were no doubt future-
oriented, but what was the quality of the future they foresaw?  
 The answer is that it was almost certainly very poor indeed. The 
mountain of fine-grained detail in the way that humans think about the 
future – its close coupling with memory, its complex stratification, and its 
individual variability – is, as a foresight practitioner, disturbing to ponder. 
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It should force us into a reconsideration of the sophistication of future 
thinking we should reasonably expect from a creature whose capacities 
are so plainly truncated as a result of its evolutionary history.  
 
 5.1 Case Study: The Long Now 
  
 One locus in which we can clearly see debate crystallizing around 
the extent of our foresight capacities is the discourse surrounding our 
seeming inability, as a species, to muster real concern and action 
addressing the long-term viability of our civilization. There is a great deal 
of worry about the way in which the human mind seizes most readily on 
those futures that are most adjacent to us in both the spatial and temporal 
sense. When we’re absorbed in and acting on only the absolute newest 
information available to us – about gas or stock or housing prices, or about 
what’s on television tonight – it becomes nearly impossible to form clear 
thoughts about and act with consideration for the long term futures of our 
selves, our communities, and our planet. We no longer give ourselves much 
time to ruminate on the broader themes of our lives: of history, both 
personal and collective, of truth and responsibility, of where we’re all 
going, of what it all means. The big questions have faded into abstraction 
and taken on the character of an immature pastime; in an always on 
culture, careful, considered, expansive thinking is seen as a distraction: 
something we used to do when we were young and didn’t have so many 
pressing responsibilities. Considerations of our past and future, and what 
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they mean to us, are put aside; our present states, and the concerns of the 
short term, seem to dominate our mental landscapes. 
  And so we behave slavishly toward our daily calendars and 
appointment alerts in an attempt to be productive and “on it.” But it may 
be those larger forces sneaking up on us, unfolding over years, decades, 
and generations – those deeper trends driving the state of our 
environments, the moral fabric of our societies, and the health of our 
institutions – that are the “it” we should really be “on”.  Maybe it’s not 
that we have no time. Maybe it’s just that we are so wired for the short 
term that we can’t see through to more the more distal dimensions of the 
future. 
 Alexander Rose worries about this mismatch between native 
foresight abilities and the modern world a lot. For Rose, our myopia 
concerning time is due in part to the limitations of our biology. “You can 
imagine a lot of biological imperatives for staying focused on the short 
term, especially in a world that was much more dangerous than the one 
that we in the developed world live in now,” says Rose (personal 
communication, July 18, 2013). But the long term can sneak up on us and 
insert itself into our day-to-day lives. “Even though the world we live in 
might not be as life or death as not having crops in the winter,” he says, “it 
can certainly have an impact on our lives when we fail to understand 
Black Swan (high impact, low probability) events” (Ibid).  
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 Rose’s solution is to repurpose those evolved biological capacities 
for being engaged in short-term timeframes and build institutions, 
construct artifacts, and make art that stretch our sense of time through 
creating a visceral and emotional engagement with the distant future. In 
fact, he is helping to build just such an institution. Rose is the Executive 
Director of the Long Now Foundation, an organization that hopes to 
encourage long-term thinking in an age of accelerating culture. Their 
10,000 Year Clock – now being built inside a mountain in Western Texas – 
is designed to operate with minimal human maintenance for millennia, 
inspiring those who ponder its epochal design to engage in imaginative 
long-term thinking. The Long Now hopes that the Clock, along with their 
other projects – like the Rosetta Disk, a repository of 1500 human 
languages microscopically etched and electroformed onto solid nickel – 
will lead the human mind to naturally wander across greater expanses of 
time; to emerge from always-on, short term thinking and adopt a more 
encompassing sense of what we mean by Now. 
 In some ways, the Long Now’s projects can be seen as a museum of 
the future. Just as visiting a museum can inspire sensations of awe as we 
are led down deep temporal pathways into the lives and values of ancient 
people, the 10,000 Year Clock invites us to wander forward in time, 
speculate about the people who’ll live there, and imagine what they might 
be like. Rose speaks passionately about this possibility: 
Designing and building a large clock, or creating a language 
archive etched onto a metal disc: those types of acts change the 
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conversation about the future. You start wondering very real things 
about those future people: What aesthetics will they value? Will this 
be something that gets destroyed in one generation, or will it be 
something that’s valued for tens – or hundreds – of generations? 
Are the hands of the people that wind this thing going to be the 
same as ours (Ibid)? 
 
 Imagining how the hands of our distant descendants might differ 
from our own does raise questions about the level of care and 
responsibility we should feel for them. “In general, the longest that people 
plan, on a personal level, tends to be for their grandchildren,” Rose 
observes, continuing: “There are certainly mechanisms for changing that. 
Jonas Salk’s sentiment about being a good ancestor is a good one, because 
it really resonates with people. People can then reflect on their own 
ancestors, and think about the choices they might’ve made. Then the 
question becomes: How will you internalize that in order to be a good 
ancestor going forward” (Ibid)? 
 Rose admits that instilling long-term thinking in people is not an 
easy task, due to our strong inborn biases toward imminent events and 
current emotional states over future events and states. Just as physical 
distance dulls the impact of tragedy, temporal distances cause us to 
discount the value of our future objectives against our immediate ones; 
my goal to be a good ancestor to future generations seems easily 
overtaken by my goal to save time in my day by driving to the grocery 
store two blocks away. And, of course, the Long Now has no proof that 
their efforts will pay off; barring radical life extension, its likely that no 
one involved in the Long Now’s projects will be around to see whether 
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their efforts pan out. But it is not part of the Long Now’s mission to 
personally witness the future; cryonicists they are not. Theirs is a project 
based on hope, an attempt to influence our culture into considering the 
distant future of humankind.  
 “If you stand in front of our clock, and are awe-struck about the 
possibilities of the next 10,000 years, then you might go home and do 
something that stretches your time frame just a little bit,” says Rose. 
 The projects undertaken by The Long Now Foundation suggest 
some understanding of the inherent biases of our future thinking. There 
are, perhaps, good reasons for this: after all, Daniel Kahneman, the father 
of research into the biases of human decision-making, has been a repeated 
guest at The Long Now’s salons. But, for media theorist Douglas 
Rushkoff, the struggle The Long Now Foundation is engaged in against 
our natural orientation toward the present and immediate future in order 
to save the future might not be without it’s own consequences. When the 
choice of where to toss a burger wrapper is bound up in the mind with 
considerations of epochal time scales, anxiety and decision paralysis can 
quickly set in. This decision paralysis is a phenomenon he calls over-
winding: making the present responsible for too much other time. “Unless 
we’re living in utter harmony with nature,” he writes in his newest book 
Present Shock, “thinking in ten-thousand-year spans is an invitation to 
nightmarish obsession. It’s a potentially burdensome, even paralyzing, 
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state of mind. Each present action becomes a black hole of possibilities and 
unintended consequences” (Rushkoff 2013, 135).24 
 For Rushkoff, the Long Now solution is another permutation of 
what he calls a culture in “present shock”, in which we make the present 
moment the center of our lives and imbue it with inordinate significance 
and responsibility. In a strange inversion, for him the 10,000-year mindset 
becomes “less of a Long Now than a Short Forever” (Ibid). Not an escape 
from the thinking that sends us into present shock, but rather acceleration 
into that black hole of possibilities.  
 And, of course, there’s the problem of overconfidence: on what 
grounds do humans, with our pithy foresight capacities, deign to speak 
for the future? I spoke to Rushkoff as he was travelling by train home 
from a speaking engagement, a much more comfortable and less 
temporally overwound method of travel than flying, he opined. “The 
Long Now People mean very well,” he admits, continuing: “What they 
want to do is help bring to light the long-term implications of stuff that 
we’re doing right now. But we don’t have movements of this same sort 
now. We don’t have the narrative expectations of doing things today for 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 We can clearly see the potential impact of overloading the present with the 
burden of the future in they way that decision makers sometimes become 
overwhelmed when presented with foresight scenarios detailing disruptive 
futures for their organizations. Because exposure to uncertainty and risk can 
oftentimes stimulate emotions of worry, fear, dread, and anxiety, provocative 
scenarios can lead decision makers to process information in a narrow and 
labored manner. As we’ve seen, visceral emotions can override rational decision-
making, leading to impulsive decision-making, states of denial, and a breakdown 
of strategic conversations (Healy and Hodgkinson 2007, 579). The lesson for 
foresight practitioners: making scenarios more evocative is not always the best 
course of action.  
	  131	  
reward tomorrow. We’ve now got a more incremental approach to things” 
(personal communication, July 17, 2013). 
 The position that Rushkoff advocates in his book is a return to 
scales of foresight that are consonant with our native abilities. Attempting 
foresight out of the range of human abilities is not only hubristic, but also 
potentially detrimental to our mental health as a species. “Your future is 
less dependent on your 401K plan than it is on how you’re connected 
meaningfully with the community in which you live,” he suggests. “The 
more connected you are, the more in the present you are, and the less 
you’re worried about the future” (Ibid). Rushkoff thinks we can safely 
dispense with long-term future thinking; it’s a task for which we’re simply 
not suited. “If we’re going to engage in appropriate behaviors,” he says, 
“in the end, the only thing that’s going to make it work is if we appreciate 
in the moment that those methods are superior. Otherwise, we’re going to 
be working against our own natures” (Ibid). 
 For me, this debate circles around a set of questions that is never 
really addressed straight on: Given the nature of human foresight, what 
level of genuine engagement with long term (and multiple) futures can we 
really expect from individuals and organizations? How can we ensure that 
we are not unduly reinforcing biased future thinking in both our 
engagement with short term and long-term horizons? What principles 
might we formulate, what methods might we devise, and what checks and 
balances might we create that harness and expand our native ability to 
	  132	  
think about the future without stretching that ability beyond its breaking 
point? I don’t think we have good answers to those questions yet, and 
especially in the context of broad, sweeping claims about either our ability 
to scaffold a 10,000 sense of Now onto human future thinking, or the 
impossibility of approaching such a project without causing extreme 
decision paralysis and anxiety, I don’t think we’ll be able to discover them.  
 
5.2  What’s Next? 
 
 A. Transform foresight into a living laboratory – The good news is 
that strategic foresight exercises are a perfect laboratory for exploring 
these questions in a systematic way, as long as we can set up the 
experimental parameters and controls properly. The methodology is, at 
least in some respects, repeatable and measurable. We could, for instance, 
take a classic foresight engagement – taking participants from signals, to 
trend analysis, to discovering and prioritizing drivers, to developing 
scenarios, and finally to devising and windtunnelling strategies – as a 
‘kernel’ for the research, then insert other, less frequently use methods – 
Delphi polling, experiential futures, futures wheel, etc. – in order to asses 
the value they add to the engagement.   
 What kind of observations might we make in the foresight 
laboratory? The most direct means would be to record video and audio of 
the group discussions that take place in each phase of the foresight 
engagement. The data that we could expect from recordings is very rich; 
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we might discover group polarizing effects amplified by shared 
worldviews, or a propensity to default to tropes of current blockbuster 
tropes that feed into availability bias, or the discounting of possible 
futures based primarily on overly thin causal stories that fail to reach 
parity with focal scenarios. We might also “seed” signals or trends that are 
intentionally engineered to engage the subjects’ biased future thinking in 
order to observe how they are carried and developed through the 
engagement.  
 B. Reframe “good future thinking” – As I wrote at the outset of 
this paper, in light of the science of human future thinking the aim of 
strategic foresight should be to teach participants the skill to develop clearly 
authored, reasonably de-biased visions of the future and formulate explicitly 
rational human-regarding strategies for flourishing within whatever future we 
happen to get. Under this lens, strategic foresight is another piece of 
“mindware” – like probabilistic reasoning and bias-mitigating strategies in 
decision-making – that augments our normal capabilities and better 
equips us to deal with the challenges of the modern world. And like these 
other pieces of mindware, keen foresight might only be possible after 
protracted exposure to a certain way of thinking; just as probabilistic 
reasoning is somewhat unnatural to us because we naturally think in 
terms of possibilities rather than probabilities, robust foresight might have 
to overcome deeply engrained cognitive biases toward short term 
thinking, causal explanations, and poor affective forecasting, among other 
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pitfalls. Robust scenarios and strategies should therefore be regarded at 
best, as a reflection of whether we’ve done the work to instill good future 
thinking in strategic foresight participants. Rather than judging the images 
of the future created during a foresight engagement on their accuracy, we 
should judge them on the level of skilled future thinking they indicate; 
even an implausible image of the future can be judged fairly if the 
intention in building it was to effect some favorable change in a group’s 
broader future thinking: so-called wildcard scenarios with highly causal 
explanation, for instance, can force us to re-examine our sense of what is 
and isn’t possible in the future and open up a space of possible futures 
around a focal scenario.  
 C. Build a Foresight Inventory – One possibility for adding a 
quantitative measure to foresight engagements would be to use a 
questionnaire similar to the Zimbardo Time Perception Inventory order or 
Keith Stanovich’s in-development Rationality Quotient Test in to establish 
a pre-engagement baseline time perception for all participants in a 
foresight exercise. Once the engagement is completed, participants’ time 
perception can be re-polled with the inventory at several intervals – a 
week later, three months later, a year later – in order to discern the effect 
and duration (if any) of the foresight engagement on individual time 
perception. Over enough trials, we might be able to discover something 
about the way that different configurations of strategic foresight 
engagements can create greater or lesser effects in altering individual 
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reports on our inventory. Of course, transforming strategic foresight 
engagements into living laboratories requires that we develop an 
inventory that is specific to measuring the preferred outcomes of strategic 
foresight engagements. A Strategic Foresight Inventory may include 
questions that investigate an individual’s tendency to produce 
counterfactuals, engage in robust episodic future thinking, examine their 
biases about the future, create strategies that are robust enough to respond 
to multiple futures, and so on. My recommendation is for foresight 
strategist to working together with experimental psychologists that 
specialize in developing psychological inventories to build a custom 
inventory to measure foresight acumen, specifically.  
 D. Create a theoretical grounding for foresight - It’s also equally 
critical that we develop a solid evidence-based theoretical ground to 
support the practice. My objective in this paper has been to move the 
conversation around the evidentiary tools and theoretical underpinnings 
of foresight forward. We have a long way to go before strategic foresight 
can meet these aspirations, and given the success of foresight, it might be 
difficult to garner support for fundamental reform. Mark Healey 
expressed strong views about this in our interview:  
Scenarios are helpful because they're intuitive and easy to work 
with. But other people would say the reason that they work is that 
they make people think harder, and simply by thinking harder, using 
more information, considering more perspectives, that loosens up 
some of these fundamental biases that have been written about in 
the behavioral decision making literature. But once you start to 
scratch that veneer away and realize there's little evidence to back 
up these claims, it turns out that, in a sense, foresight is based on 
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some fairly limited pieces of evidence (personal communication, 
November 20, 2013). 
 
 The deeper issue is that there hasn’t been a concerted effort to build 
a solid theoretical ground for the practice of foresight. If foresight is to 
gain legitimacy as an evidence-backed methodology then it needs to test 
its assumptions, abandon “folk psychological” accounts of future 
thinking, and transform itself into a discipline built on a sound scientific 
understanding of the way humans imagine and reason about the future. 
Peter Bishop, a Professor Emeritus of Foresight at the University of 
Houston Futures program, points out that the lack of such a solid 
theoretical foundations is not uncommon in practitioner-led disciplines 
like foresight. “In any discipline,” he notes, “there are at least two levels of 
conversation going on: the delivery of what the discipline offers, and the 
“back room” stuff where you might say the ideas and methodologies and 
research is taking place” (Bishop 2014). For Bishop, foresight lacks this 
“back room” because most of this type of research happens in universities 
at the doctoral level:  
There is no organized group of researchers with a cadre of graduate 
students who spend all of their time doing research on the kinds of 
questions you’re asking. We are a group of practitioners. And I do 
believe in most disciplines, practice preceded theory. Most people 
think research happens first and then people apply it. That does 
happen. But usually, it’s the opposite. Architecture is practice driven. 
The theoretical foundation of any new discipline will be very thin 
until it becomes successful and then it can afford to have that 
background available. Without high quality doctoral programs, the 
growth of our field is inhibited. It would give us much more 
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credibility if we had those, but getting those established is a 
tremendous effort (Bishop 2014).25 
 
 I am inclined to agree that having doctoral programs dedicated to 
foresight research would do a great deal to advance the state of the 
practice. That being said, I also believe that there are research groups 
doing work that has immediate implications for our practice; in this paper, 
I have tried to showcase some of this research, which is being conducted 
in cognitive science, management studies, and psychology doctoral 
programs throughout the world. There is much that we foresight 
practitioners could learn from seeking out researchers in these fields who 
are studying human decision making and foresight in order to test our 
methods and assumptions against their results. And if the field lacks the 
resources to establish stand-alone doctoral programs, we can always 
instead recruit these research professionals into our communities of 
practice. The roster of The Greatest Good, a Chicago-based consultancy, 
can serve as a template: it has representatives from the worlds of 
management consulting as well as psychology and economics, including 
Daniel Kahneman himself. Especially as institutions of higher education 
forge closer ties with private enterprise through start-up incubators and 
other programs that encourage entrepreneurship among young scholars, 
we should expect to see more organizations that develop both original 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 During our conversation, Bishop did reference the doctoral program at the 
University of Manoa as an exception to this observation, but also points out that 
it is technically a degree in Political Science and so is unlikely to address the 
kinds of questions posed in this paper.  
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research and innovative practitioner models in-house. In my opinion, the 
foresight practice is well positioned to take advantage of these 
developments. 
 
 5.3 Closing Remarks 	  
 The influence of the strategic foresight methodology continues to 
grow. A survey of UK-based organizations conducted in 2006 found that 
over a third used scenario planning as part of their toolkit for devising 
strategies (Hodgkinson et al. 2006). A 2009 study by the European 
Foresight Monitoring Network found that the most widely used foresight 
methods among 1000 examined exercises were, in order of frequency: 
literature review (54%), expert panels (50%), scenarios (42%), trend 
analysis (25%), and futures workshops (24%). The sharp decline between 
third and fourth place is interesting, but as a whole the top five 
methodologies would’ve been at home in a foresight activity conducted in 
the early seventies. Why have the core methods of foresight remained 
virtually unchanged for decades?  
 One likely explanation is that the most commonly used methods 
can create the impression of a fruitful engagement with possible futures 
without any need to demonstrate the activity’s worth in the present. 
Despite the effort of foresight practitioners to distinguish themselves from 
futurists, the products of both professions enjoy the benefits of temporal 
discounting, another tendency of the human mind unearthed by 
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experiments in behavioral economics. In short, we tend to discount the 
value of those things that are remote from the present; one marshmallow 
today exerts far more pull on us than two marshmallows a week from 
now. Savvy futurists place their predictions far enough in the future that 
their misfires won’t (rightfully) damage their forecasting careers. In like 
fashion, since the horizon of foresight activities is almost always beyond 
the purview of an organization’s operational concerns, the question of 
whether scenarios are robust enough is necessarily deferred. By the time 
the investigated horizon arrives, organizations have already moved on, 
and aren’t likely to turn their sights back on a five-to-ten year old foresight 
project to assess its utility.  
 The temporal remoteness of foresight horizons is, of course, also 
what makes it difficult to make a case for foresight’s actual, as opposed to 
perceived, utility. But despite the lack of provability, organizations are still 
willing to engage in foresight activities to assuage their skittishness about 
the future. The way that the value of foresight is communicated highlights 
the schizophrenic nature of the foresight practice as it stands today: at 
once, foresight practitioners insist that foresight isn’t about prediction per 
se, but then tout examples of successful foresight like the Shell scenarios, 
which that organization used to correctly forecast the possibility of an oil 
shock caused by an embargo originating in the Arab world.  
 My suspicion is that much of this confusion is due to the fact that 
foresight practitioners have been overly fixated on the quality of the 
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outputs of foresight – the scenarios, the strategic recommendations, etc. – 
and less focused on the effect that the exercises tangibly have on the 
ability of participants to change their mental models based on clear 
thinking about the future. One reason for this might be that changes to 
mental models and toolkits have been difficult to measure, historically. 
But a maturing science of human decision-making is beginning to change 
this.  
 In closing, in this paper I’ve tried to point the way toward new 
framing objectives, evidentiary tools, and theoretical foundations for 
strategic foresight. I’ve argued that foresight professionals should aim to 
make organizations aware of the operation of biases in the course of a 
strategic foresight engagement, or at the very least to lead them through 
exercises constructed to mitigate the pull that biases and heuristic thinking 
have on the way we think about the future. The only way to approach this 
project with any legitimacy is to engage with the sciences that are 
investigating the ways that features of our minds systematically lead 
humans astray, and to base our proposed solutions and engagements on 
evidence-backed methodologies for either temporarily suspending the 
cognitive barriers to good foresight or, in the preferred scenario, granting 
clients a deeper sense of control over the way they think about the future.  
 I believe this means, at a minimum, introducing new checks and 
balances into the foresight methodology. It seems to me that foresight has 
a bit of an aversion to overtly quantitative or scientific methods. One 
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foresight practitioner offered some early feedback on the ideas in this 
paper, which took the form of reminding me that Peter Schwartz’s book is 
called “The Art of the Long View”, and Kees van der Heijden’s is called 
“The Art of Strategic Conversation”.  
 Of course, I have some sympathy with this view. Historically, it’s 
been important to distinguish foresight from the work of forecasters and 
futurists, whose liberal use of quantitative trend extrapolation, especially 
in the social and technological realms, has overemphasized a deterministic 
view of the future at the expense of credibility and nuance. But if foresight 
is to lay claim legitimately to being a methodology that in fact improves 
our future thinking, it has to establish the veracity of this claim through 
painstaking measurement, not mere salesmanship. 
 And what impact does human foresight have on changing the 
evolution of culture, in any case? We simply do not have good answers to 
these more fundamental issues. Anthropologist Alex Mesoudi applies a 
skeptical lens to the claim that cultural evolution is directed by human 
foresight in any meaningful way, arguing instead that cultural evolution 
proceeds in ways that have more in common with biological evolution. 
The ability for humans to mentally travel forward in time – to employ 
foresight – does not invalidate Mesoudi’s claim, since foresight itself “may 
evolve through a past process of blind evolution” (Mesoudi 2007). Indeed, 
I have argued that this is the case when we allow the biases of our 
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foresight to shape our view of the future in ways that are antithetical to 
constructing and meeting our goals.  
 It doesn’t help that real data on the efficacy of strategic foresight is 
difficult to come across. In a recent study of 77 multinational firms, top-
performing organizations reported that strategic foresight activities 
delivered value through an enhanced capacity to perceive, interpret, and 
respond to change, to influence other actors through shared images, and 
to enhance capacity for organizational learning (Rohrbeck & Schwarz, 4); 
an interesting finding, though it amounts to self-reporting. As Mark 
Healey and Gerard Hodgkinson point out in their critique of strategic 
foresight: “…hard empirical evidence to substantiate these fundamental 
claims concerning the cognitive benefits of scenario-based techniques is 
both highly equivocal and limited in scale and scope, comprising in the 
main descriptive case accounts of apparently successful applications of the 
techniques in action” (Healy and Hodgkinson 2007, 568). 
 However, I do not think that all is lost. If strategic foresight is really 
about improving our mental models of the future, as is now commonly 
understood, then its utility and transformative potential should be 
immediately demonstrable by re-probing individuals’ cognitive toolkits 
and mental models in the wake of a strategic foresight engagement. “One 
thing you can always do,” says Thomas Suddendorf pointed out during 
our interview, “is hold a mirror in front of people and make them aware 
of their potential biases so that they become more alert to them” 
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(Suddendorf 2014).  Developing that “mirror” in the form of protocols and 
methods for measuring individual and group foresight capacity would 
help us answer a whole host of questions: Has the exercise decreased the 
hold of foresight-related biases on the minds of those who went through 
the exercise, or who have been exposed to the resulting material? Has it 
made them aware of the origin of these biases in their own minds in a 
systematic way, so that they can work to avoid their effects? Has it had 
any impact on the time perception valences of participants to make them 
more future-oriented? Has it increased their facility with employing 
semantic knowledge to the future in robust ways? Has it made their 
images of the future more representative, robust, extended, and 
contextualized?   
 Devising ways to measure and report on these changes will serve to 
legitimize (or perhaps, condemn) strategic foresight. But it’s potential 
exceeds even this. If indeed cultural evolution has largely been guided by 
blind evolution, as Mesoudi claims, then transforming foresight into a 
measurable science may be the best chance humans have of wresting 
control of our future both from blind evolutionary forces and our own 
inherited biases, and reshaping it to promote human survival and 
thriving. It is encouraging for the future of robust discourse between the 
theory and practice of foresight to hear similar sentiments echoed by both 
the scientists and foresight practitioners who agreed to be interviewed for 
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